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In the second half of the twentieth century, the number of 
international courts and tribunals available to help settle 
transnational disputes exploded.  During the same period, there 
was also a proliferation of research in social choice theory that 
illustrates a range of ways that the aggregation of preferences and 
judgments can create inconsistent results.  This research has 
become an increasingly important tool for legal scholars who seek 
to understand the strategic constraints that shape judicial decision-
making.  One important insight gained from this scholarship is the 
existence of the “doctrinal paradox.”  The doctrinal paradox shows 
that under certain conditions, the decision-making processes of 
multi-member courts can be indeterminate because the outcomes 
of cases change based on the way that the judges choose to 
aggregate their judgments.  In other words, the same distribution 
of opinions among a panel of judges may result in either party A or 
party B winning a particular case, depending on the method that 
the judges use to reach a final decision.  The doctrinal paradox thus 
not only creates outcomes that may appear logically incoherent, 
but since it results in decisions that are at tension with the 
precedent they create, it also threatens the integrity of the 
development of law more broadly.  
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This Article is the first to explore the important implications 
that the doctrinal paradox has for international adjudication.  To 
do so, we have undertaken one of the first efforts to compile 
comparative data on the decision-making procedures and dissent 
rates of international courts.  By coupling this information with 
insights from international relations and international law, we 
argue that there are unique features of international courts and 
tribunals that affect the causes and consequences of the doctrinal 
paradox.  Specifically, since international courts are uniquely 
vulnerable to having their decisions ignored by litigants but still 
provide an essential avenue for the development of the corpus of 
international law, the impact of paradoxical decisions can be 
magnified.  We also discuss examples where the doctrinal paradox 
can arise and has arisen during the course of international 
adjudication.  Finally, we argue that the designers of international 
legal institutions should explicitly consider the tradeoffs associated 
with maintaining flexible policies versus adopting a fixed 
judgment aggregation mechanism.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the international 
community created a dramatic number of new international 
forums to resolve transnational disputes.  Today, there are more 
than two dozen permanent courts and more than one hundred 
judicial bodies and procedures that resolve legal disputes through 
international adjudication.1   
These courts, tribunals, and panels have also played an 
increasingly important role in addressing a range of critical 
international issues that had previously been resolved through 
diplomacy and politics alone.2  As the frequency and the stakes of 
international adjudication have increased, scholars and 
practitioners have wisely leveraged the theoretical insights from 
different fields of scholarship in order to improve the efficacy of 
the international legal project and thus put its operation, not just its 
mandate, on a clearer conceptual foundation.  
One field of research that has rapidly expanded in conjunction 
with the proliferation of international courts and tribunals is social 

1 See Cesare P.R. Romano, A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions, 
2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 241, 241–42 (2011) (documenting the existence of 142 
international “bodies and procedures” that are part of the effort to “control[] 
implementation of international law”).   
2 See, e.g., Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: 
Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 61 INT’L ORG. 669, 670 (2007) 
(“[S]cholars have argued that the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
have fundamentally transformed the European Union (EU) legal system, that 
decisions by the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body have 
amounted to judicial policymaking, and that judgments by the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) have 
helped to establish a substantial new body of international law.”) (footnotes 
omitted).   
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
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choice theory.3  This field of scholarship seeks to understand the 
properties of decision-making in group settings.  The key insight of 
this research is that the decision-making processes of individuals 
who have formed collective entities—whether as corporations, 
juries, or panels of appellate courts—are different from the 
decision-making processes of an individual.4  This insight has 
profound implications for many fields of scholarship and has been 
increasingly incorporated into legal theory.5  By thinking of judges, 
juries, and legislatures as collective, and not singular, entities, it 
has been possible to elucidate the strategic considerations that 
constrain decision-making in legislative and judicial bodies.6  
Social choice theory has thus successfully been deployed to help 
explain everything from the evolution of criminal law to 
constitutional interpretation on the Supreme Court.7   

3 Writing more than twenty-five years ago, Amartya Sen stated that “[t]he 
number of books and papers published in formal social choice theory has now 
certainly exceeded a thousand, the bulk of it coming in the last decade and a half.”  
Amartya Sen, Social Choice and Justice: A Review Article, 23 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
1764, 1765 n.7 (1985).   
4 See generally CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, 
DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 4 (2011) (defending the existence of 
group agency as a phenomenon separate from, though reconcilable with, 
“methodological individualism”). 
5 See id. at 1 (“The issue of group agency lies at the heart of social-scientific 
and economic methodology and of legal and political philosophy.”).  See also 
Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, The Supreme Court 
2008 Term, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2009–2010) (arguing that although the topic has 
not yet been fully explored, “[p]ublic law is rife with system effects”).  See 
generally MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009) (describing public choice theory’s rise in prominence 
as due to its providing “means of closing the gap between the normative 
prescriptions . . . [of] the traditional economic analysis of law . . . [with] the 
observed realities of legal practice and doctrine”).  
6 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 20–22 (2009) (arguing that the doctrinal paradox may temper the 
claimed benefits of the “wisdom of the crowds” effect that comes from having 
many judges decide an issue).  Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS 
PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 16–19 (2006) (exploring the successes and recommending 
different methods of aggregating the knowledge of “many minds”). 
7 See, e.g., LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 6–9 (2011) (arguing that 
social choice theory can help to explain a number of peculiar features of our legal 
and criminal justice system); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 
Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 352, 376 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court should be thought 
of as a “they” and not an “it”).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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In the context of multi-member courts, one contribution of 
social choice theory that has been particularly useful is the 
identification of the doctrinal paradox.8  This paradox is that when 
a group of judges has to make decisions in a case that involves 
several connected propositions, and they have divergent views on 
how the case should be decided, the outcome of the case can 
change based on whether the court chooses to aggregate its overall 
judgment on how the case should be disposed of; or, instead, 
chooses to aggregate its judgments on each individual proposition.  
In other words, the same facts, law, and distribution of viewpoints 
can result in either party winning the case depending on which 
way the judges choose to count their votes.  Although the paradox 
may be rare, it is more than simply a theoretical possibility.  
Research on the Supreme Court has shown that the decision on 
how to aggregate votes in the face of the doctrinal paradox may 
have altered the result “in well over one hundred cases, and it 
would certainly have led to different results in twenty or thirty 
[S]upreme [C]ourt cases.”9  When the doctrinal paradox does 
occur, it not only creates a logically incoherent decision in the 
instant case, but also creates a broader problem for the integrity of 
the development of law because the outcomes of prior cases are 
incompatible with the reasoning about how individual issues 
should be viewed.10  The result is that the paradox risks creating 
law that is not “consistent, interpretable, [or] action-guiding.”11  It 
also illustrates the mistake of viewing collective decision-making 
bodies as singular, rational agents.12  Despite these ramifications, to 
date, existing scholarship has focused on either discussing 
hypothetical examples or high profile cases that arose in appellate 
litigation in the United States.  

8 Philip Pettit and others have also more recently referred to this 
phenomenon as the “discursive dilemma.”  For further discussion on this point, 
see infra text accompanying note 47.  
9 John M. Rogers, “Issue Voting” by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Response 
to Some Radical Proposals, 49 VAND. L. REV. 997, 999 (1996).  
10 See generally Christian List & Philip Pettit, On the Many as One: A Reply to 
Kornhauser and Sager, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 377, 377 (2005) (citing RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE (1986)) (discussing the “integrity challenge” presented by the 
doctrinal paradox).  
11 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 4, at 15.   
12 See id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
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Given this limited emphasis in the existing scholarship, the 
unique implications that the doctrinal paradox has for 
international adjudication have been almost entirely ignored by 
scholars and practitioners.  Our project aims to be the first to 
provide a systematic look at the implications that this important 
insight from social choice theory has for the design and decision-
making procedures of international courts and tribunals.  To do so, 
we have undertaken what are, perhaps, the first efforts to compile 
comparative data both on the formal decision-making procedures 
of the permanent international courts, and on the rates that 
international judges on a range of courts file dissenting and 
concurring opinions.  Using this data, we demonstrate that policy 
makers and judges have not established procedures regarding 
what should happen when a decision in a case has two justifiable 
results, even though the structural features that lead to the 
doctrinal paradox are present in international courts.  Moreover, 
we will argue that when the doctrinal paradox does occur, the 
consequences are magnified.  This is both because states are able to 
refuse to comply with international decisions and because 
transnational legal decisions play an important role in establishing 
the corpus of international law.  Paradoxical decisions convey 
unclear messages to other courts and legal actors.  As a result, the 
doctrinal paradox is not just an interesting theoretical problem—it 
is an important source of indeterminacy that should be considered 
by the practitioners and policy makers who design the institutions 
that facilitate international adjudication.13  
Our project makes two important contributions.  First, we hope 
to bring the doctrinal paradox, and more broadly, the problems of 
judgment aggregation, to the attention of scholars and practitioners 
of international law.  This may help the contributions from 
research on judgment aggregation to be taken into consideration 
by the designers of new international courts and tribunals and by 
judges on existing courts, who should consider whether to take the 
proactive step of adopting a clear position on judgment 
aggregation mechanisms.  Second, we hope to launch a discussion 
on how distinct features of adjudication and decision-making in 

13 It is worth noting that indeterminacy is what results when it is unclear how 
a collective body will act given a set of preferences of judgments.  See JON ELSTER, 
EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 413–
419 (2007). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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different settings can influence the cause and consequences of the 
doctrinal paradox.  Specifically, we propose that scholars seek to 
explain the mechanisms that lead to the doctrinal paradox in 
different contexts and the implications that this may have for 
adjudication.  By focusing on the distinct characteristics of different 
forms of adjudication, policy makers and institutional designers 
may be more likely to take the risks of indeterminacy in decision-
making seriously, and to consider fully the tradeoffs of formal 
judgment aggregation mechanisms versus more flexible 
approaches.  We believe that both of these contributions have 
important theoretical and practical implications.  
With these goals in mind, our paper proceeds in four parts.  In 
Section 2, we explain the evolution of social choice theory, and 
then discuss the relevance of this research to the practice of 
adjudication by multi-member courts.  In Section 3, we argue that 
it is important that the insights from judgment aggregation theory 
generally, and the doctrinal paradox specifically, be applied to 
international adjudication.  To do so, we canvass the official 
policies dictating how the judges on permanent international 
courts and tribunals are to resolve cases, which allows us to 
illustrate how certain features of international adjudication help to 
pave the way for occurrence of the doctrinal paradox.  
Additionally, we analyze how the features of international legal 
institutions can magnify the consequences of the doctrinal paradox 
because states have the power to refuse to comply with adverse 
decisions; we discuss how the mixed messages sent by the 
decisions can potentially be more problematic to the growth of 
international law than they would be in a domestic setting.  In 
Section 4, we explore how the doctrinal paradox has arisen in the 
course of international adjudication and how it could occur in the 
future.  Specifically, we describe how the doctrinal paradox has 
occurred in the European Court of Human Rights and how it may 
appear in other contexts like international panels making scientific 
judgments and during international arbitration.  In Section 5, we 
turn to considering the potential ways to resolve the paradox.  
Given the considerable variation among international courts and 
tribunals, we do not attempt to prescribe one solution.  Instead, we 
discuss how the approaches available to resolve the paradox 
present unique tradeoffs in international contexts.  It is our 
ultimate position that there are justifiable reasons for taking a 
number of different approaches, but that judgment aggregation 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
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methods should be an important consideration when the policies 
and procedures of international courts are established.   
2.   JUDGMENT AGGREGATION THEORY 
In the second half of the twentieth century, a massive literature 
in social choice theory emerged that sought to understand how 
decisions are made in group settings.14  The core of this literature 
focuses on how groups aggregate their preferences, focusing 
specifically on when groups have to issue a decision on what they 
believe to be true or false.  One strand of this literature takes this 
premise further by studying how groups make decisions where 
there are multiple underlying premises that must be considered.  
Since one important purpose of the court system is to make true-
or-false decisions on a series of claims or propositions, this analysis 
has clear implications for legal scholars and practitioners.  To date, 
the legal theorists who have tried to arbitrage ideas from judgment 
aggregation theory have primarily focused on how they can help 
to explain and inform the way that adjudication is conducted in 
appellate litigation in the United States.  As a result, it is our hope 
to explain the importance and relevance of the problems raised by 
judgment aggregation theory before turning to examine how the 
failure to addresses these issues can create harms that are unique 
to and accentuated in adjudication in international settings. 
This Section proceeds in four parts.  First, we explain existing 
research on judgment aggregation theory.  Second, we turn to 
examining one specific problem of judgment aggregation, the 
doctrinal paradox.  This paradox is strongly associated with 
adjudication by multi-member courts, and is thus of particular 
relevance to the proceedings at international courts and tribunals.  
Third, we discuss several high-profile cases where the doctrinal 
paradox has occurred in appellate litigation in the United States.  
These examples help to illustrate both that the paradox is more 
than simply a theoretical possibility, as well as how judges have 
altered their decisions in inconsistent ways to avoid paradoxical 
results.  Finally, we consider the drawbacks associated with both of 
the judgment aggregation methods available to resolve cases when 

14 Christian List, The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review, 
187 SYNTHESE 179, 179 (2012) (“The theory of judgment aggregation is a growing 
interdisciplinary research area in economics, philosophy, political science, law 
and computer science.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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the doctrinal paradox occurs.  Although they have previously been 
debated in the domestic context only, the drawbacks associated 
with both methods have the potential to manifest themselves in 
international law and, as we will discuss later in Section 5, may 
even be worse.  
2.1. Social Choice Theory and Judgment Aggregation 
The field of social choice theory grew out of the important 
contributions of Condorcet and Arrow.15  In 1785, the Marquis de 
Condorcet published a now-famous essay that demonstrated that 
when there are at least three people making a decision together 
over at least three options, there are conditions under which it is 
impossible for a stable majority to be reached in favor of any of the 
options.16  For example, if three people were deciding among 
options A, B, or C, it could be the case that if each person were to 
rank their preferences, then it could result that A is preferred to B, 
that B is preferred over C, but that C is preferred over A.17  What 
then is the rational and fair ordering of the options for our group of 
three?  There is none, according to Condorcet; none of the options 
is preferred by a majority to any of the other options.  The 
important implication of the Condorcet paradox—also known as 
the voting paradox—is that the principle of transitivity, “which 
operates as a basic rationality assumption for individuals, cannot 
be assumed for groups.”18  Despite its theoretical importance, 

15 See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE 
ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 44 (2000) (“The intellectual 
discipline of social choice grows out of a deceptively simple problem that a French 
philosopher and mathematician, the Marquis de Condorcet, described in a famous 
essay in 1785.”) (footnote omitted); see also Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. 
Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and 
Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2124 (1990) (noting that, in social 
choice theory, the “most important discovery continues to be that for which the 
economist Kenneth Arrow received the Nobel Prize”).  For a discussion of the 
intellectual history of social choice theory with a number of examples that have 
been said to pre-date Condorcet and Arrow, see WULF GAERTNER, A PRIMER IN 
SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 3–6 (2006).  
16 See STEARNS, supra note 15, at 45 (explaining that the principle of 
transitivity is that if “C is preferred to A and A is preferred to B” then it logically 
follows that one must “prefer C to B”).  
17 For an easy-to-follow explanation of the Condorcet paradox, see Lewis A. 
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial 
Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 12 n.22 (1993).  
18  STEARNS, supra note 15, at 45. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
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Condorcet’s insight lay largely dormant until it was generalized by 
Kenneth Arrow in the mid-twentieth century.19  Arrow’s 
contribution was to extend Condorcet’s analysis to prove that 
when “searching for democratic procedures that would aggregate 
the given preferences of individuals into a single collective 
outcome, . . . [Condorcet’s] paradox turns out to be an inescapable 
feature of any decision-making process likely to be considered 
even minimally fair.”20  Arrow was thus able to show that 
democratic procedures alone are not able to create rational and fair 
ways to resolve the paradox that Condorcet had identified.21  
These initial insights created social choice theory, which is 
perhaps best described as “the logical study of the properties of 
collective decision-making processes.”22  Since Arrow’s 
groundbreaking work, the field of social choice theory has 
exploded to become one of the largest and most influential in the 
social sciences.23  This research has focused “not so much [on] the 
empirical question of how groups actually do make decisions, [but] 
rather [on] the normative and logical questions of how they 
should, and could, aggregate information about the views, 
interests or preferences of individuals into group decisions.”24  
Additionally, it is worth noting that not only have Condorcet’s and 
Arrow’s important contributions influenced a large volume of 
scholarship, but the research that has followed from their ideas has 

19 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 
1963); see also Christian List & Ben Polak, Introduction to Judgment Aggregation, 145 
J. ECON. THEORY 441, 442 (2010) (arguing that “Arrow’s work struck a chord across 
the social sciences”).  But see ELSTER, supra note 13, at 454 (“Kenneth Arrow may 
have rediscovered and generalized Condorcet’s insight, but he was not influenced 
by him.”).   
20 Pildes & Anderson, supra note 15, at 2131.  
21 For an excellent explanation of Arrow’s contribution, see ALFRED F. 
MACKAY, ARROW’S THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL CHOICE: A CASE STUDY IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 1–5 (1980). 
22 Pildes & Anderson, supra note 15, at 2124. 
23 See STEARNS, supra note 15, at 45 (citing Sen, supra note 3, at 1765 n.7) 
(arguing that “the modern theory of social choice” has “proved to be among the 
largest and most influential bodies of social science literature”); see also Maxwell L. 
Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1224 (1994) 
(noting that the “literature in the field of social choice has proliferated”).  
24 John S. Dryzek & Christian List, Social Choice Theory and Deliberative 
Democracy: A Reconciliation, 33 BRIT.  J. POL. SCI. 1, 2-3 (2003).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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spanned a wide range of topics and fields.25  This is because the 
realization that it may be impossible for the preferences of 
individuals to be aggregated in a way that is consistent and 
rational has profound implications for those concerned with the 
outcomes produced by any collective decision-making body, from 
tenure committees to juries to national legislatures.26   
One specific branch of social choice theory that is of particular 
relevance to judicial adjudication is judgment aggregation.27  The 
key distinction that makes judgment aggregation a subfield of 
broader social choice theory is that there is a difference between 
the preferences of individuals and the judgments of individuals.28  In 
other words, there is a difference between the statement “I prefer 
outcome A” and the statement “outcome A is correct or true.”  The 
implication of this distinction is that there are greater logical 
constraints imposed upon actors seeking to render judgments than 
those simply trying to form collective decisions.29  Judgment 
aggregation is thus distinct from general social choice theory 
because it often deals with binary judgments instead of rankings of 
preferences, and the importance of logical consistency to avoid 
paradoxical results is higher.  
Unsurprisingly, scholars interested in judgment aggregation 
theory have paid particular attention to adjudication of multi-

25 See Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, supra note 23, at 
1224–25 (“Perhaps more astounding than the quantity of literature generated 
under the label ‘social choice’ is the range of propositions that Condorcet’s initial 
insight has been used to support in recent years.”); See also Sen, supra note 3, at 
1764 (noting that social choice theory has “immediate and extensive implications 
for economics, philosophy, politics, and the other social sciences”).   
26 For an interesting recent example of how social choice theory can be used 
to understand the law, see KATZ, supra note 7.  
27 See generally Christian List & Philip Pettit, Aggregating Sets of Judgments: 
Two Impossibility Results Compared, 140 SYNTHESE 207, 214 (2004) (describing an 
aggregation procedure “which takes as its input a profile of complete, consistent 
and deductively closed personal sets of judgments across the individuals . . . and 
which produces as its output a collective set of judgments . . . which is also 
complete, consistent and deductively closed”). 
28 See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 
YALE L.J. 82, 84 n.4 (1986) (“Sen introduces a distinction between the aggregation 
of individual interests and individual judgments.”) (citing Amartya Sen, Social 
Choice Theory: A Reexamination, 45 ECONOMETRICA 53 (1977), reprinted in AMARTYA 
SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 158 (1982)). 
29 See List & Polak, supra note 19, at 442 (noting that judgment “aggregation 
problems differ from preference aggregation not just in their interpretation, but 
also in the constraints governing them”).  
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member courts.30  This is both because multi-member courts are 
collective decision-making institutions31 and also because there is a 
high premium placed on logical consistency in judicial decisions.  
Of course, although adjudication by multi-judge courts may be the 
primary focus of judgment aggregation, it is worth noting that 
judgment aggregation theory has evolved into a diverse field of 
research.32  Research in judgment aggregation is related to work in 
other fields, including abstract aggregation theories33 and belief 
merging in computer science.34  In fact, the field has grown to the 
point that that researchers have even attempted to leverage 
insights from biology to understand collective decision-making 
procedures.35  The common feature of all of these lines of research, 
however, is the recognition that it can be impossible for multiple 
actors to democratically make logically consistent decisions across 
more than one issue.  

30 See Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not An It: Interpretive Theory 
and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 553 n.8 (2005) 
(“Important literatures in social choice and voting theory have explored 
aggregation problems on multi-judge courts.”); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 
28, at 88 (“The distinction between preference aggregation and judgment 
aggregation sharpens our focus on the question of multi-judge courts.”).  
31 See Vermeule, supra note 30, at 552 (“[T]he collective structure of judicial 
institutions means that it is simply inadequate to theorize about interpretation as 
if the judiciary were a unitary institution, perhaps conceived as a single 
individual.”).  
32 See generally List, supra note 14 (exploring the growing research area related 
to judgment aggregation). 
33 See, e.g., Ariel Rubinstein & Peter C. Fishburn, Algebraic Aggregation Theory, 
38 J. ECON. THEORY 63, 63 (1986) (presenting a unifying algebraic framework to 
analyze general aggregation problems); Robert Wilson, On the Theory of 
Aggregation, 10 J. ECON. THEORY 89, 89 (1975) (discussing how algebraic structures 
support “logical restrictions on the possible ways of aggregating individuals’ 
preferences”).  
34 See, e.g., Sébastien Konieczny & Ramón Pino Pérez, Merging Information 
Under Constraints: A Logical Framework, 12 J. LOGIC & COMPUTATION 773, 805 (2002) 
(presenting a “logical framework for belief base merging in the presence of 
integrity constraints when there is no preference over the belief bases”); Gabriella 
Pigozzi, Belief Merging and the Discursive Dilemma: An Argument-Based Account to 
Paradoxes of Judgment Aggregation, 152 SYNTHESE 285, 295 (2006) (using a belief 
merging operator defined in artificial intelligence to address the literature on 
judgment aggregation).  
35 See Christian List & Adrian Vermeule, Independence and Interdependence: 
Lessons from the Hive 2 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 10-44, 2010), available at http://dx.doi.org 
/10.2139/ssrn.1693908 (building upon judgment aggregation scholarship by 
exploring the collective decision-making processes of honeybees).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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2.2. The Doctrinal Paradox  
Although judgment aggregation theory has generated a 
number of important ideas, one that is of particular importance to 
adjudication is the doctrinal paradox.36  The doctrinal paradox was 
first identified in an important article in the Yale Law Journal by 
Kornhauser & Sager in 1986; however, the concept was mentioned 
only in passing.37  Six years later, Kornhauser introduced the term 
“doctrinal paradox,”38 and a body of scholarship began to develop 
that explored the implications of their discovery.39  The basic 
insight of the doctrinal paradox is that when judges have to decide 
a series of connected issues in order to render an overall judgment 
in a case, the resulting judgment is dependent on whether the 
judges take a majority vote on the overall outcome of the case or if 
the judges instead take separate votes on the individual issues of 
the case.40  In other words, the specific protocol that judges use to 
decide cases can produce different results.  

36 Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 12 n.22 (noting that “the doctrinal 
paradox is distinct from the Condorcet paradox”).  For an explanation of why the 
doctrinal paradox is different than the Condorcet, logrolling, sequential, and 
Ostrogorski paradoxes, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts II: Legal 
Doctrine, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441 (1992) [hereinafter Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial 
Courts II].   
37 Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 1 n.1 (noting that they “identified in 
passing the doctrinal paradox” in their previous article on judgment aggregation 
(citing Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 115–16)); see also List, supra note 14, at 
2  (“The initial observation that motivated much of the current [research on 
judgment aggregation] had its origins in the area of jurisprudence, in Kornhauser 
and Sager’s work on decision making in collegial courts . . . .”) (citation omitted).  
But see LIST & PETTIT, surpa note 4, at 43 (describing historical precursors to the 
current literature).  
38 See Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts II, supra note 36, at 467 (outlining 
how “[c]ase-by-case and issue-by-issue adjudication may, in some circumstances, 
produce two different resolutions of a case”); see also List, supra note 14, at 181 
(noting that the term “doctrinal paradox” was introduced by Kornhauser in his 
1992 article).  Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 3 (“This paradox, which we 
call the doctrinal paradox, is a prominent instance of the broader proposition that 
appellate adjudication is a collective endeavor that can only be fully understood 
once its collective features are considered.”). 
39 See Dimitri Landa & Jeffrey R. Lax, Legal Doctrine on Collegial Courts, 71 J. 
POL. 946, 946 (2009) (“[Kornhauser & Sager’s initial] result was later named the 
Doctrinal Paradox, and it inspired a growing body of literature on collegial 
application of a fixed legal rule, spanning legal theory, social choice theory, and 
deliberative democratic theory.”) (citations omitted).  
40 For a useful, concise statement of the doctrinal paradox, see Jean-François 
Bonnefon, Behavioral Evidence for Framing Effects in the Resolution of the Doctrinal 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
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The doctrinal paradox can be best illustrated through a simple 
hypothetical example initially offered by Philip Pettit.  His example 
considers a three-judge court deciding a torts case.41  To decide the 
case, assume that the existing legal doctrine holds that the judges 
must first decide the outcome of two separate issues.  The first 
issue is whether the defendant’s negligence was causally 
responsible for the harm suffered by the plaintiff.  The second issue 
is whether the defendant had a duty of care towards the plaintiff.  
Based on their answers to those two issues, the judges then have to 
determine if they believe that the plaintiff is indeed liable in the 
case.  Assume the three judges make the following judgments on 
each of the three questions: 
 
 Cause of Harm? Duty of Care? Liable? 
Judge A Yes Yes Yes 
Judge B Yes No No 
Judge C No Yes No 
Outcome 2 – 1 2 – 1 1 - 2 
In this scenario, there are two judges who believe that the 
defendant is not liable.  As a result, if the court were to aggregate 
their judgment by simply taking the majority view as to whether 
the defendant was liable, the decision would be in favor of the 
defendant.  On the other hand, there were two votes in favor of the 
plaintiff on both of the sub-issues of the case.  If the court were to 
aggregate their judgment by taking the majority view on each of 
the sub-issues of the case, the result would be in favor of the 
plaintiff.  Since these are both logically justifiable ways to 

Paradox, 34 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 631, 631 (2010) (“A doctrinal paradox occurs 
when majority voting on a compound proposition (such as a conjunction or 
disjunction) yields a different result than majority voting on each of the elements 
of the proposition.”).  For one of the initial articulations of the paradox, see 
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 11 (“The fact that a court in a rather simple 
case of this sort could face a choice between two voting protocols, each of which 
seems quite reasonable, indeed natural, to follow and yet discover that the 
outcome of the case will turn on the choice between them, is the product of a 
structural paradox latent in appellate adjudication.”).  
41 Philip Pettit, Collective Persons and Powers, 8 LEGAL THEORY 443, 444–45 
(2002).  It has been argued that this was roughly the situation in the famous torts 
case, Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).  Lewis A. Kornhauser, 
Aggregate Rationality in Adjudication and Legislation, 7 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 5, 15 
(2008).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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aggregate the judgment of the court, the aggregation method that 
the court selects will determine the outcome of the case.  Thus, as 
this illustration of the doctrinal paradox makes clear, this 
distribution of individual beliefs makes the ultimate outcome of 
the case indeterminate.42 
From this insight—that the way judgments are aggregated 
impacts the outcome of cases—a robust literature quickly 
developed that focused on multi-member courts.43  The initial 

42 It is worth noting that judges may still be open to persuasion and willing to 
change their minds on how issues should be resolved.  The doctrinal paradox 
occurs, however, when the views held by decision-makers result in the type of 
distribution we have just described.  In other words, the logic does not assume 
that preferences are fixed, but instead that at times, even judges open to 
persuasion may not reach agreement.  
43 For a general discussion of the evolution of the literature, see Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, Appeal and Supreme Courts, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 45 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & 
Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/7200book.pdf 
[hereinafter Kornhauser, Appeal and Supreme Courts].  To follow the progression of 
the debate in jurisprudential circles as set forth in Kornhauser, Appeal and Supreme 
Courts, see John M. Rogers, “I Vote This Way Because I’m Wrong”: The Supreme 
Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 KY. L.J. 439 (1991) (preferring case-by-case 
aggregation to issue-by-issue aggregation because of the latter’s possibility of 
creating indeterminacy and incoherence); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial 
Courts I: Path-Dependence, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 169 (1992) (identifying the 
possibility of choosing among result-bound, rule-bound, and reason-bound 
elements of stare decisis in the process of decision-making and arguing in favor of 
result-bound decisions); Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts II, supra note 36, at 
453–57 (introducing the term “doctrinal paradox” and differentiating it from the 
Condorcet cycle); David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A 
Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J. 743 (1992) [hereinafter Post & 
Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater] (favoring issue-by-issue aggregation because 
it will yield the same results every time and encourages collegial deliberation 
among judges); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 57 (suggesting that the 
multi-judge panels have a “metavote” on whether the judges should adopt a case-
by-case outcome or an issue-by-issue outcome); John M. Rogers, supra note 9, at 
1038 (arguing against issue-by-issue aggregation because judges cannot agree on 
how to divide the issues, and even if they were to agree, judges would 
occasionally oppose a judgment of their own court); Maxwell L. Stearns, How 
Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue Identification: A Reply to Professor John 
Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1045, (1996) (challenging Rogers’ argument 
that dividing issues is a difficult task); David G. Post & Steven Salop, Issues and 
Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 
49 VAND. L. REV. 1069 (1996) [hereinafter Post & Salop, Issues and Outcomes] 
(supporting Stearns’s argument that it is not problematic to divide issues in 
decision-making); Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on 
Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, at 2380 (1999) (arguing against vote-
trading and collegial decision-making); Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive 
Voting Protocol for Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 75–15 (2003) (offering a 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
	
	


		 
 U.Pa.J.Int’lL.  !"#$

focus of research into the doctrinal paradox was thus on the 
implications for appellate adjudication.44  Although the original 
paradox formulation focused on cases where judges must decide 
issues that are sequenced in an specific order because of existing 
legal doctrine,45 Philip Pettit generalized the doctrinal paradox by 
showing the problem arises any time a group must decide a series 
of related issues.46  Pettit thus renamed this phenomenon the 
discursive dilemma,47 and he helped extend the reach of the 
literature from concerns over jurisprudence to political and formal 
theory more broadly.48  In this paper, we will continue to refer to 
this phenomenon as the doctrinal paradox. 

methodology for addressing disputes when doctrinal paradoxes arise); Michael I. 
Meyerson, The Irrational Supreme Court, 84 Neb. L. Rev. 895, at 955 (2006) 
(exploring the idea that “group decision-making leads to the unavoidable 
possibility of truly irrational opinions, those in which a majority of Justices vote 
that one party prevails on all relevant issues, but that party still loses that case”).  
44 See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 6 (“Appellate adjudication by 
multi-judge courts is a complex practice which has important ingredients of both 
redundant and collegial enterprise.”); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 82 
(“Appellate adjudication, the common, almost exclusive focus of theories of 
adjudication, is thus essentially a group process, yet extant theories neither 
explain the group nature of the process nor take it into account.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
45 Philip Pettit, Groups with Minds of Their Own, in SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS: 
THE NATURE OF SOCIAL REALITY 167, 168 (Frederick F. Schmitt ed., 2003) (“This 
paradox arises when a multimember court has to make a decision on the basis of 
received doctrine as to the considerations that ought to determine the resolution 
of a case: that is, on the basis of a conceptual sequencing of matters to be 
decided.”) (citation omitted). 
46 See Philip Pettit, Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma, 11 PHIL. 
ISSUES 268, 274 (2001) (listing five basic elements that summarize the doctrinal 
paradox).  
47 See id. at 272 (“I prefer the word ‘discursive’, because the problem in 
question is not tied to the acceptance of common doctrine, only to the enterprise 
of making group judgments on the basis of reasons.  I prefer the word ‘dilemma’, 
because while the problem generates a choice in which each option has its 
difficulties, it does not constitute a paradox in any strict sense.”).  
48 For an excellent review of the evolution of the literature that has emerged 
from Kornhauser & Sager’s discovery of the doctrinal paradox, see List, supra note 
14.  For examples of the formularization and increasingly generalized nature of 
the literature that has emerged, see generally, Franz Dietrich & Philippe Mongin, 
The Premiss-Based Approach to Judgment Aggregation, 145 J. ECON. THEORY 562 
(2010); Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation, 23 
ECON. & PHIL. 269 (2007); Christian List, The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason, 
116 ETHICS 362 (2006); Christian List, The Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex 
Collective Decisions, 24 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 3 (2005); Christian List & Philip 
Pettit, On the Many as One: A Reply to Kornhauser and Sager, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 377 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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2.3. The Doctrinal Paradox in Practice  
Although scholars discussing the doctrinal paradox have 
primarily focused on situations in which the problems associated 
with judgment aggregation could theoretically arise,49 research on 
this topic did not take off until a series of court cases brought the 
paradox to the attention of academics.50  Shortly after Kornhauser 
& Sager’s initial identification of the doctrinal paradox, two 
Supreme Court cases occurred in which a Justice purposely voted 
against the rationale he agreed with to avoid the distribution of 
votes fitting the conditions of the doctrinal paradox.  Scholars then 
identified other cases where the doctrinal paradox occurred in the 
course of appellate litigation. 
The first of the Supreme Court cases was Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas Co.51  In this case, the Supreme Court had to decide two related 
issues.52  The first issue was whether the Eleventh Amendment 
bars Congress from acting under the Commerce Clause in a way 
that makes states vulnerable to suit in federal court.  The second 
issue was, assuming that Congress did have the power, whether 
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
(SARA) was an exercise of that power.  For the case to go forward, 
both questions had to be answered “yes.”  In this instance, five 
Justices did answer “yes” to each question—but not the same five.  
As a result of the distribution of views, only four Justices were 
supportive of allowing the suit to go forward.  To avoid this 
paradoxical result, Justice White explicitly changed his vote on the 
outcome of the case in favor of allowing the suit to go forward, 
although his reasoning would have otherwise dictated against it.  

(2005); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The Many as One: Integrity and 
Group Choice in Paradoxical Cases, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 249 (2004). 
49 See, e.g., List, supra note 14, at 179 (noting that the problems associated with 
judgment aggregation theory can arise in contexts “ranging from legislative 
committees to referenda, from expert panels to juries and multi-member courts, 
from boards of companies to international organizations, from families and 
informal social groups to societies at large”).  
50 See, e.g., Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 1 n.1 (noting that the rise in 
scholarship on this topic is likely because “the Supreme Court’s recent and 
disturbing encounters with the doctrinal paradox have begun to excite attention”).  
51 491 U.S. 1 (1989).  For a discussion of this case, see generally Rogers, “I Vote 
This Way”, supra note 43.  
52 Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 14. 
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Thus, the court only avoided the doctrinal paradox because an 
individual Justice changed his vote. 
 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 
 Power to 
Act? 
Exercised in SARA? Allow Suit? 
Blackmun Yes Yes Yes 
Brennan Yes Yes Yes 
Kennedy No No No 
Marshall Yes Yes Yes 
O’Connor No No No 
Rehnquist No No No 
Scalia No Yes No 
Stevens Yes Yes Yes 
White Yes No ? 
Outcome 5–4 5–4 ? 
 
Just two years later, the same phenomenon occurred in Arizona 
v. Fulminante.53  In Fulminante, the Supreme Court decided three 
connected issues.54  The first issue was whether the defendant in 
the case was coerced into a confession.  The second issue was 
whether the “harmless error” doctrine applies if a coerced 
confession is entered into evidence.  Assuming both issues are 
answered in the affirmative, the third issue was whether the 
admission of the defendant’s testimony in this particular case was 
a non-harmless error.  Only if all three questions were answered 
“yes” would the defendant be given a new trial.  In this case, a 
majority did answer affirmatively on each issue. However, as with 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., the distribution of beliefs was such 
that if the Justices voted based on their individual determination as 
to whether a new trial should occur, the answer would be no.  Here 
again, the two aggregation methods produced different 
outcomes.55  As a result, Justice Kennedy changed his vote on 
whether a new trial should be awarded so that the outcome of the 

53 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
54 Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 14–15. 
55 As others have argued, it is important to speak in the “speculative voice” 
in this case because Justice Souter chose not to vote on every part of the case.  
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 15 n.36.    
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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case reflected the votes on each of the individual propositions in 
the case.   
Arizona v. Fulminante 
 Coerced 
Confession? 
Harmless 
Error      
Applied? 
Non-
harmless 
Error? 
New   
Trial? 
Blackmun Yes No Yes Yes 
Kennedy No Yes Yes ? 
Marshall Yes No Yes Yes 
O’Connor No Yes No No 
Rehnquist No Yes No No 
Scalia Yes Yes No No 
Souter No Yes Not         
Decided 
Not    
Decided 
Stevens Yes No Yes Yes 
White Yes No Yes Yes 
Outcome 5–4 5–4 5–3 ? 
In addition to these two examples where Justices changed their 
votes on the outcome of the case to avoid the doctrinal paradox, 
scholars identified and began to debate a third case in which the 
doctrinal paradox came before the Supreme Court.56  In National 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,57 the Supreme Court 
had to decide two issues to determine if diversity jurisdiction 
should extend to citizens of the District of Columbia.58  The first 
issue was whether the District of Columbia counted as a “state” for 
the purpose of diversity jurisdiction in federal court.  The second 
issue was whether Congress could extend diversity jurisdiction 
beyond the strict confines of Article III of the Constitution.  An 
affirmative answer to either question would provide a basis to 
extend diversity jurisdiction to the citizens of D.C.  In the case, 
however, a substantial majority rejected both rationales.  That said, 
there were still five votes in favor of extending diversity 
jurisdiction overall.  As a result, by a margin of five votes to four, 

56 See, e.g., Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note 43, at 748–50, 
764–65 (describing National Mutual Insurance v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 
(1949), as an example of the doctrinal paradox).   
57 337 U.S. 582 (1949).  
58 See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 20–21 (summarizing Tidewater’s 
doctrinal issues).  
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the Court decided to extend jurisdiction, although a substantial 
majority of the Court rejected both possible rationales for doing so.  
 
National Mutual Insurance v. Tidewater Transfer Co. 
 Is D.C. a 
“State”? 
Extending Article III? Statute 
Valid? 
Black Yes No Yes 
Burton Yes No Yes 
Douglas No No No 
Frankfurter No No No 
Jackson Yes No Yes 
Murphy No Yes Yes 
Reed No No No 
Rutledge No Yes Yes 
Vinson No No No 
Outcome 3–6 2–7 5–4 
These examples help illustrate three important points about the 
doctrinal paradox.  First, the doctrinal paradox is not simply a 
theoretical possibility; the opinions of judges in real cases have 
been distributed such that the outcome of the case hinged on the 
method of judgment aggregation that was employed.  Second, 
since judges are willing to change their votes to avoid the doctrinal 
paradox, it may be that the doctrinal paradox is influencing the 
outcome of cases where the paradox itself is not observed.  Third, if 
courts do not explicitly select a formal judgment aggregation 
method, individual judges may change their votes to ensure the 
outcome of the case is consistent with the method they deem most 
legitimate.  Taken together, these points illustrate why the 
doctrinal paradox should be of interest to scholars and 
practitioners who care about judicial outcomes being consistent 
and fair.  
2.4. The Options for Avoiding Indeterminacy  
As the previous discussion illustrates, it is not merely a 
theoretical possibility that the distribution of judgments in a case 
can create two logically justifiable outcomes.  Rather, the doctrinal 
paradox is a real phenomenon that impacts the disposition of cases 
adjudicated on multi-member courts.  As described above, courts 
have two possible judgment aggregation methods at their 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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disposal.59  The first, outcome-based voting, resolves cases by 
counting the judges’ votes on what the result of the case should be.  
This was the approach taken by the Court in Tidewater.60  The 
second method, issue-based voting, resolves cases by taking the 
majority vote on each issue considered in the case, and then 
adopting the logically required outcome dictated by those votes.  
In both Union Gas61 and Fulminante,62 one Justice changed his vote 
so that the resolution of the case was consistent with issue-based 
voting.  Although these two judgment aggregation methods have 
been given different names by different commentators,63 there has 
been an active debate comparing the relative drawbacks of these 
approaches in the decision-making processes of the U.S. Supreme 
Court and of the Circuit Courts of Appeal.64   
Unfortunately, the doctrinal paradox is a problem without an 
easy solution.  The primary objection to issue-based voting has 
focused on the problems associated with forcing judges to agree on 
what issues are at stake in each case.65  In cases with clearly 
established doctrine that dictates exactly what issues the members 
of a court must decide and in what order they must decide them, 
this is not a major problem, and issue-based voting may be a 
reasonable practice.  However, in many cases, identifying the legal 
issues is itself a complicated matter.  For example, current Sixth 

59 See, e.g., Dietrich & Mongin, supra note 48, at 563 (“Prima facie, there are 
two plausible ways for the court to reach a decision by taking majority votes.”).  
60 See supra text accompanying notes 56–58 (discussing the doctrinal paradox 
in Tidewater).   
61 See supra text accompanying notes 51–52 (discussing Union Gas).   
62 See supra text accompanying notes 53–55 (discussing Fulminante and 
comparing the case with Union Gas).    
63 See List & Polak, supra note 19, at 459 (noting that within the class of 
aggregation rules are included “premise-based rules” or “issue-by-issue voting,” 
on the one hand, and “conclusion-based rules” or “case-by-case voting,” on the 
other); Bonnefon, supra note 40, at 632 (discussing “elemental” versus “compound 
aggregation”). 
64 We focus on the drawbacks because the existing scholarship primarily 
addresses which one of the judgment aggregation methods has greater flaws.  See, 
e.g., Post & Salop, Issues and Outcomes, supra note 43, at 1084 (advocating for issue-
based voting while noting that “[b]oth issue voting and outcome voting have 
potential flaws.”).   
65 For a very clear summary of how social choice theory explains this result, 
see Stearns, supra note 43, at 1063 (“Without outcome[-based] voting, the 
determination of issues and issue levels would determine the outcome of the 
case.”).   
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Circuit Judge John M. Rogers illustrated this problem while still a 
professor at the University of Kentucky College of Law by 
identifying seventeen different issues that were decided, explicitly 
or implicitly, by the Supreme Court in Tidewater en route to 
determining how to dispose of the case.66  If courts were to adopt 
issue-based voting procedures, the concern is that “judges would 
have an incentive to divide down [the issues of the case], until a 
favorable voting path emerges . . . .”67  This method thus gives the 
advantage to the members of a court who can successfully 
manipulate the proceedings to ensure that their preferred set of 
issues are the ones that will be decided in any given case.68  
Moreover, issue-based voting creates the additional problem of 
harming judicial economy because judges are forced to consider 
how they would resolve each issue that the court determined was 
important in a given case, even if they have already found a 
dispositive issue.69  Although some scholars have downplayed 
these concerns, the major drawback of issue-based voting is that it 
pushes judges to focus on strategically advantageous issues instead 
of legally important ones.70   
In contrast, the major drawback of outcome-based voting is that it 
produces confusing legal precedent.  The argument is that when 
decisions in cases such as Tidewater are handed down, the “orderly 
development of legal doctrine” is harmed.71  When a case is 
decided such that the reasoning and votes on the individual issues 
do not support the conclusion reached by the court, “it produces 
precedent that is both less useful and may be incapable of coherent 

66 Rogers, supra note 9, at 1002–04 (cataloguing the “Issues on which justices 
disagreed in Tidewater” as well as “the number of votes for and against the 
issue”). 
67 Stearns, supra note 43, at 1064.  
68 See id. (“With issue[-based] voting, one imagines [judicial] confirmation 
proceedings in which the parliamentary skills of the Supreme Court nominees are 
. . . more[] important than such matters as integrity, fitness for judicial service, 
knowledge of the law, or even jurisprudential perspective.”). 
69 Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note 43, at 758-59 
(describing the judicial economy argument often advanced in favor of outcome-
based voting).   
70 See Post & Salop, Issues and Outcomes, supra note 43, at 1074–75 (explaining 
Professor Rogers’ “indeterminacy objection” to issue-based voting—that “[t]here 
is no developed body of law on how issues must be divided for separate voting”).  
71 Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 25.   
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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application.”72  It is unclear, for instance, how a court should apply 
the Tidewater decision to a future case that involves only a subset of 
the same issues because, in Tidewater, the finding on the individual 
issues did not support the ultimate outcome.  Even if outcome-
based voting makes it easier to decide a specific case because the 
judges do not have to decide which issues are important, this 
method will make the resolution of future cases harder due to the 
logical disconnect between the rationales that have been provided 
and the outcomes that are required.  Of course, it could be said that 
this is no more problematic than plurality opinions, which courts 
already have to interpret to determine precedent,73 but it is still a 
problem that outcome voting injects logically inconsistent positions 
into the law.  
Given that this discussion may make issue-based and outcome-
based judgment aggregation methods both seem unappealing, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that some scholars have advocated a flexible 
approach that allows multi-member courts to implement one or the 
other method based on the facts and circumstances of an 
individual case.74  Although we will discuss the tradeoffs 
associated with flexible voting in more detail in Section 5, it is 
important to note at the outset that failure to clearly establish a 
fixed judgment aggregation method also has a significant 
drawback: indeterminacy.  Indeterminacy occurs when it is unclear 
how an actor or institution—like a multi-member court—will act in 
the face of a given set of preferences or judgments.75  
Indeterminacy is a problem for judicial adjudication because it 
means that the same case could have a different result depending 

72 See Post & Salop, Issues and Outcomes, supra note 43, at 1070 (referring to 
this problem as the “guidance objection” to outcome-based voting).  
73 See Rogers, supra note 9, at 1007 (stating that, while practitioners seeking to 
apply plurality opinions “must examine how the authors of each opinion would 
resolve the case,” plurality opinions, in aggregate, “have the full force of law”) 
(citing Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of 
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 46 (1994)).    
74 See, e.g., Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 30–33 (advocating for judges 
to use a “metavote”—a vote at the “collegial action” stage on whether to apply 
issue-based or outcome-based voting—in cases where the doctrinal paradox 
occurs); Nash, supra note 43, at 146–57 (proposing a “context-sensitive voting 
protocol” by which courts determine whether to use either issue-based or 
outcome-based voting).  
75 See ELSTER, supra note 13, at 415–16 (using the example of a municipal 
council to demonstrate that social preferences might be indeterminate—there 
might be no procedure that accurately predicts the outcome of a group decision).  
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on which procedure the court adopted, and that it is impossible to 
know which way the court will act from case to case.76  For 
example, imagine the cries of unfairness that would arise if in some 
cases a tie vote by the Supreme Court (which can occur if a Justice 
recuses himself or herself) resulted in deferring to the circuit court, 
while in other cases the tie was broken by the most senior Justice 
participating in the decision.  Moreover, an additional drawback of 
a flexible approach is that when confronted with a case that 
presents a doctrinal paradox, judges will have to decide both the 
issues of the case and the procedure that should be used to 
aggregate the vote.  As a result, simply leaving courts to address 
the doctrinal paradox may not necessarily be the optimal solution.  
At this point, it should hopefully be clear that there are 
tradeoffs associated with every approach when faced with the 
doctrinal paradox.  What is less clear, however, is how the 
particular features of adjudication in international settings affect 
these tradeoffs.  International courts may have reason to be 
especially sensitive to the problem of wasting judicial resources 
associated with issue-based voting, the problem of communicating 
unclear precedent to other legal actors associated with outcome-
based voting, and the problem of real and perceived arbitrariness 
associated with flexible approaches.  It is thus worth analyzing the 
implications of the doctrinal paradox for adjudication in 
international settings.  We begin this project here.  
3. CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOCTRINAL PARADOX IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
While scholars have long recognized the important concerns 
that the doctrinal paradox poses for judicial adjudication, very 
little research has addressed its application to international 
adjudication.  This oversight is particularly surprising because, in 
the second half of the twentieth century, the number of forums for 
international dispute resolution exploded.77  Today there are more 

76 See Vermeule, supra note 5, at 14 (“Here too, however, a less provocative 
way of stating the problem is in terms of indeterminacy rather than incoherence: a 
given profile of judgments will yield different collective judgments under 
different aggregation procedures.”).  
77 See generally Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial 
Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709 (1999) (providing a 
systemic overview of the expansion of the international judiciary). See also Eric A. 
Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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than 140 different judicial bodies and procedures that exist to 
resolve international legal disputes.78  Of these bodies, there are 
currently more than twenty-five permanent international courts 
with independent judges issuing decisions that are legally 
binding.79 These international judicial bodies have become 
increasingly powerful while addressing a range of important 
substantive legal issues,80 from facilitating the integration of 
Europe81 to changing the scope of the laws of war.82  Moreover, the 
proliferation of international institutions and courts has also given 
rise to a series of new issues that are not simply international 
analogs of domestic problems, but instead unique by-products of 
the international environment.83  While it is indisputable that the 

REV. 1, 3 (2005) (“[I]nternational courts proliferated in the aftermath of World War 
II, with a noticeable acceleration after the end of the Cold War.”).  
78 See Romano, supra note 1, at 241–42 (stating that the rapid growth of 
international dispute resolution forums in the post-Cold War era, “with well over 
142 bodies and procedures,” has been difficult to “comprehensively map”).  
79 See Karen J. Alter, The Evolving International Judiciary (Buffett Ctr. for Int’l & 
Comparative Studies, Working Paper Series No. 11/002, 2011) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1859507 (“[T]here are at 
least 26 permanent international courts . . . .”); see also Erik Voeten, The Impartiality 
of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 417, 417 (2008) (“[S]tates have created about two dozen permanent 
international judicial bodies with formally independent judges that issue legally 
binding judgments and many more quasi-judicial or nonpermanent dispute 
settlement mechanisms.”) (citing DANIEL TERRIS, CESARE P.R. ROMANO, & LEIGH 
SWIGART, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN 
WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES 4–5 (2007)).  
80 Posner & Yoo, supra note 77, at 11 (“[I]nternational tribunals have become 
more powerful as a matter of formal law over time.  Compulsory jurisdiction has 
become more common, and the judiciaries have become more independent of the 
states that establish them.”).  
81 See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 
(1991) (explaining the role of the European Court of Justice, among other 
international institutions, in creating a cohesive European Community).  See also 
Randall W. Stone, Risk in International Politics, 9 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 40, 58 (2009) 
(noting that “international courts have steadily expanded their prerogatives and 
provided a powerful impulse to European integration”) (citing Geoffrey Garrett, 
International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community’s Internal 
Market, 46 INT’L ORG. 533 (1992)).  
82 See generally Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the 
International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2006) 
(discussing the role of the Nuremberg, Tokyo, Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
international military and criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court 
in shaping the laws of war). 
83 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 81, at 41 (arguing that long-term problems are 
harder to address “at the international level, because the international level 
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scope of international adjudication is expanding, it is also the case 
that international legal institutions are still in their early stages of 
development, and their decisions are frequently ignored by 
litigants.84  As a result of the unique challenges faced by 
international courts and tribunals, international adjudication is 
fertile ground upon which to explore the implications of the 
doctrinal paradox.  This Section aims to start that process by 
exploring the reasons why the doctrinal paradox is especially 
potent in international settings.  To do so, we have collected 
original data on the policy and procedures used to decide cases in 
permanent international courts.  Further, we undertake one of the 
first efforts to present comparative data on the rates at which 
dissenting and concurring opinions are filed in international 
courts.  
This Section proceeds in four parts.  First, we discuss the lack of 
attention paid to the unique risks associated with judgment 
aggregation and the doctrinal paradox in international 
adjudication.  Many parties are guilty of this lapse, including 
political theorists working on social choice questions, scholars of 
international law, and policy makers who have established 
international institutions.  Second, we explore why the conditions 
that lead to the doctrinal paradox are present in international 
settings.  These reasons include: the role of dissenting opinions in 
international judgments, the potential for bias that results from the 
design of international adjudicatory bodies, and the still-evolving 
nature of international laws and procedures.  Third, we explain 
that when the designers of international legal institutions do not 
consider the tradeoffs associated with different judgment 
aggregation policies, judges are placed in a position to establish 
procedures that may lead to undesirable outcomes.  Specifically, 
we argue that the failure to establish formal judgment aggregation 
rules creates a risk of both allowing informal coercion and 

imposes greater supermajority requirements”); Karen J. Alter, Delegating to 
International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 37, 43–44 (2008) (explaining how compulsory dispute adjudication “differs 
fundamentally at the international level compared to the domestic level” because 
the interests of the state and the international court are not aligned); Jacob Katz 
Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 411, 
434 (2008) (noting that “there are a number of factors, some unique . . . to the 
international system, that work in favor of judicial discretion”).  
84 See infra Section 3.4.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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exacerbating the democratic deficit already present in international 
institutions.  Finally, this Section concludes by arguing that the 
doctrinal paradox poses risks to already-weak international 
institutions that are greater than those posed in domestic settings.  
Simply put, in international settings, disgruntled litigants have a 
greater range of options, including noncompliance and exit, when 
confronted with adverse decisions.  Consequently, issuing 
decisions that do not clearly communicate the state of the law 
impedes the development of the corpus of international law.  
3.1. Situating Judgment Aggregation in International Adjudication 
The contributions of social choice theory, including the 
doctrinal paradox, have particular relevance for understanding the 
law generally, collective decision-making, and how to structure 
practices and procedures in adjudicatory institutions.85  The value 
of these insights is not only applicable in domestic contexts, but 
also provides leverage to problems that arise in international 
settings.  Despite this fact, there has been an unfortunate 
discrepancy between the progress made in judgment aggregation 
theory and the application of this theory to international 
adjudication.  In this Section, we argue that there has been a lack of 
attention to the unique features of judgment aggregation in 
international settings from scholars researching the doctrinal 
paradox and social choice theory more broadly, from international 
law scholars, and from the institutional designers of international 
courts and tribunals.  
First, scholars of the doctrinal paradox have not considered the 
unique features of international adjudication in their research.  The 
first discussion of the doctrinal paradox arose in passing in 
Kornhauser & Sager’s prominent article Unpacking the Court, which 
analyzed theories of adjudication for multi-judge courts.86  The 
subsequent research on this topic moved to a discussion of specific 
Supreme Court and appellate court decisions in the United States.87 
From this line of research, scholars quickly pivoted to 
abstracting away from specific historical cases, pointing out that 

85 See generally STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 5. 
86 See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 28.  
87 See supra Section 2.3; see, e.g., Rogers, “I Vote This Way”, supra note 43 
(citing various Supreme Court decisions to evaluate the ramifications of the 
doctrinal paradox upon the vote of various justices). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
	
	


		 
& U.Pa.J.Int’lL.  !"#$

the doctrinal paradox is a general problem that can occur in a 
range of situations.88  Since this analytic move, researchers have 
primarily focused on providing hypothetical cases where the 
doctrinal paradox could arise in order to illustrate broader 
theoretical claims.89  The result is that researchers have not only 
failed to use examples from international courts and tribunals to 
illustrate their points,90 but they have also failed to consider how 
indeterminate results might either arise from or create unique 
problems in international settings.91 
Second, academics researching adjudication in international 
courts and tribunals do not appear to have taken note of the 
doctrinal paradox, or judgment aggregation theory more broadly, 
in their scholarship.  Although there have been passing references 
to the doctrinal paradox in scholarship on international law,92 it 
does not appear that any research has tried to systematically 
explain the implications that this line of research has for 
international courts and tribunals.  The cursory attention that the 
doctrinal paradox has received is in many ways surprising.  In the 
last several decades, scholarship in international law has 
increasingly incorporated ideas from international relations and 
other disciplines.93  This development has been largely embraced 

88 See, e.g., Pettit, supra note 41, at 451–54 (explaining that the doctrinal 
paradox or “discursive dilemma” arises in any group context). 
89 See, e.g., List & Polak, supra note 19, at 6–15 (describing the interplay of 
judgment aggregation and Arrow’s theorem); see also List, supra note 14, at 179 
(“[T]he theory of judgment aggregation looks at the structural properties that 
different judgment aggregation problems have in common, abstracting from the 
details of individual cases.”). 
90 Not only have prominent scholars not discussed cases from transnational 
courts, but there also does not appear to be much discussion in the literature of 
examples of the doctrinal paradox occurring in domestic courts outside the 
United States.  But see Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 12 (mentioning the 
House of Lords and other English “superior” courts as an example of collegial 
courts).  
91 See D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 1029, 1040–48 (2011) (explaining the failure of Stearns and Zywicki’s 
recent book PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS, supra note 5, to address the presence of 
these issues in the international context).  
92 See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 693, 741 (2011) (citing scholarship on the doctrinal paradox to 
support the proposition that “group behavior must be analyzed at the group level 
in order to make sense of it”) (internal citation omitted). 
93 Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the 
Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 361 (1999) 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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as a way of developing a deeper and more complex understanding 
of how diverse political actors behave during international 
adjudication.94   
Moreover, instead of ignoring theoretical concerns, the 
literature on international courts and tribunals has largely formed 
around several important debates with strong theoretical 
underpinnings.  For example, scholars have actively debated 
whether the proliferation of international legal institutions creates 
a risk of fragmentation;95 which features of international tribunals 
are most likely to engender compliance by parties to the 
litigation;96 and what the limits of international law are and should 
be.97  As part of this recent theoretical turn in international legal 
scholarship, there have even been occasional attempts to integrate 
ideas from social choice theory.98  These attempts, however, have 

(“[I]nternational relations (IR) theory, a branch of political science, has animated 
some of the most exciting scholarship in international law.”). 
94 See, e.g., David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of International Courts 
and Tribunals, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 401, 406 (2006) (“[O]ur understanding of the 
variety of political functions of, and justifications for, courts becomes richer and 
more complex by examining international courts and tribunals not only in terms 
of international relations, but also in terms of the political theory of domestic 
courts.”).  
95 See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and 
Tribunals: International Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 160 
(2000) (discussing the consequences that the lack of attention given to new courts 
and tribunals may have on international law); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of 
Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the International 
Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791, 798–801 (1999) (suggesting that a 
more dynamic International Court of Justice is necessary to remedy concerns 
pertaining to lack of clarity in international law). 
96 Compare Posner & Yoo, supra note 77, at 27–28 (arguing that the most 
successful tribunals are dependent tribunals), with Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors 
Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 901–05 (2005) (explaining the faultiness of 
Professor Posner and Yoo’s theory that dependent tribunals are most effective and 
desirable form of tribunal) (citing Posner & Yoo, supra note 77).  
97 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
203 (2005) (“Efforts to improve international cooperation must bow to the logic of 
state self-interest and state power.”); see also ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW 
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 33–48 (2008) (explaining 
how the concepts of reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation are central to 
understanding the scope and role of international law).  
98 See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory 
and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 745, 754–67 (1995) 
(discussing how public choice theory is useful in analyzing matters of 
international law, particularly executive power, currency controls, trade, and the 
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overlooked the doctrinal paradox as a specific and useful insight.  
As a result, international law scholars have not yet considered 
whether international courts and tribunals should take actions to 
avoid the possible indeterminate voting patterns that the doctrinal 
paradox can create. 
Third, it does not appear that the instruments drafted to 
establish international courts and tribunals have provided 
guidance on how cases that produce indeterminate voting patterns 
should be resolved.  To investigate this issue further, we collected 
the rules of procedure for the permanent international courts and 
tribunals identified in Professor Karen Alter’s recent article 
surveying the international judiciary.99  For each of these judicial 
bodies, we collected the treaty establishing the court or tribunal as 
well as the documents published by the court that established the 
rules and procedures for how judgments would be made.100  For 
each document, we then evaluated five elements of the rules that 
are relevant to the question of whether the doctrinal paradox could 
be observable and how it should be resolved.101  Those elements 
are: (1) whether the tribunal’s decisions are made public; (2) 
whether a reason for each decision is required; (3) whether dissents 
are allowed; (4) how “majority voting” is discussed in the event 
that dissents are permitted; and finally, (5) whether there is any 
discussion of how judgments should be aggregated when 
indeterminate voting patterns occur.  The results of this research 
are presented in the Appendix.102 

protection of culture); see also John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Against 
Global Governance in the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 354–58 (2004) (citing 
scholarship on public choice theory to support the proposition that the scope of 
WTO authority should not be expanded). 
99 For a discussion of the Alter’s typology, see Alter, supra note 79.  
100 Alter’s list contains twenty-five permanent international courts.  Id. at 4.  
Unfortunately, insufficient documentation was available to reliably code the 
policies of five courts: the Benelux Court of Justice (BCJ); the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU); the Central African Monetary 
Community (CEMAC); the Dispute resolution system of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and the Southern Common Market 
(MERCUSOR).  As a result, these courts were not included in the Appendix, infra.  
101 See Appendix, infra for a complete summary of the provisions of each of 
the permanent international courts and tribunals that are relevant to judgment 
aggregation. 
102 It is worth noting that there is still considerable work to be done to fully 
explain the variation in the procedures used by international courts and tribunals.  
We are not aware of any academic efforts to fully document the different 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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Based on this analysis, we can say with confidence that 
international courts do not have formal rules that govern how 
judgments should be aggregated when the doctrinal paradox 
occurs during adjudication.  Of course, given that domestic courts 
have not formally adopted judgment aggregation mechanisms, it is 
unsurprising that permanent international courts and tribunals 
have not either.  Interestingly, our data show that seventeen of the 
nineteen judicial bodies we analyzed do have a rule in place 
asserting that decisions will be made by a majority vote.  For 
example, Article 55 of the International Court of Justice Statute 
provides: “All questions shall be decided by a majority of the 
judges present.”103  However, these treaties are not clear as to 
whether a majority vote is required for each of the issues presented 
in a case, or for the overall resolution of the controversy.  This 
situation means that the doctrinal paradox is a real possibility for 
the majority of the international courts.  This lack of clarity is 
particularly extreme in the case of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (“IACtHR”).  Article 16 of the Rules of Procedure of 
the IACtHR provides: “The Presidency shall present, point by 
point, the matters to be voted upon. . . . The decisions of the Court 
shall be adopted by a majority of the Judges present at the time of 
the voting.”104  Alas, the text does not clarify what the Court 
should do if the individual votes mandated by the President differ 
from the overall majority view on what the outcome of the case 
should be.  Moreover, not only do the rules governing the judicial 
procedures of international courts fail to explicitly provide 
judgment aggregation mechanisms, but many also include specific 
provisions requiring that courts provide their reasoning and allow 
dissents.  By revealing the distribution of the judges’ opinions and 
their justifications for how individual points should be resolved—
which does not occur with courts that only issue unanimous 
decisions—it makes it possible to observe the doctrinal paradox.  In 
other words, these courts have put the conditions that make the 

procedures used by international judicial bodies while also exploring the factors 
that drive those differences. 
103 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 55, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 3 Bevans 1179. 
104 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, art. 16(1), (3), LXXXV [85th] Regular Period of Sessions, Nov. 16–
28, 2009, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento.cfm. 
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doctrinal paradox possible in place, but have not issued clear 
guidance on how it should be resolved.105 
Finally, surveying international courts in this way makes it 
clear that there is a great deal of variance in the procedures 
adopted by international courts, but that the implications of this 
variance has not yet been fully explored.  Although we have only 
considered judgment aggregation, future research should continue 
to explore how these differences in procedures impact 
international litigation and the development of international law 
along a range of dimensions.   
3.2. The Conditions Necessary for the Doctrinal Paradox & 
International Adjudication 
There has unfortunately been relatively little theoretical or 
empirical research into the conditions that give rise to occurrences 
of the doctrinal paradox in the course of international adjudication.  
To review, the doctrinal paradox arises when multiple judges hold 
a distribution of opinions that do not result in a consistent majority 
view on how the individual components and overall outcome of 
the case should be decided.  As we argue in this part, the 
conditions necessary for this situation to materialize are all present 
in international courts and tribunals.  Specifically, international 
judges and arbitrators have shown their willingness to file separate 
and dissenting opinions to express their views, and the evolution 
of international law and judicial bodies has created an 
environment that makes occurrences of the doctrinal paradox a 
distinct possibility.  
The first reason that the doctrinal paradox may occur in 
international settings is that concurring and dissenting opinions 
are often filed.  This is significant because a requirement of the 
doctrinal paradox is that adjudicators hold differing opinions on 
how a case should be decided.  The willingness and ability of 
judges to file separate opinions is thus a necessary condition for the 
doctrinal paradox to manifest itself in judicial decisions.  It is then 
significant that there is a long history of judges penning separate 
opinions in transnational court decisions.  For example, of the 
twelve advisory opinions that the International Court of Justice 
issued in its first twenty years of operation, only one was 

105 For a lenghtier discussion on “observable” instances of the doctrinal 
paradox, see infra Section 4.1. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
	
	


		 
% DOCTRINALPARADOX &&

unanimous.106  Despite this history of active dissent, the 
phenomenon has been largely overlooked in comparative 
international legal scholarship that analyzes the characteristics of 
transnational courts.  In fact, there have not yet been any articles or 
studies that have comprehensively examined dissent rates in 
international courts.  
Therefore, in order to examine the phenomenon more fully, we 
collected data on the rate at which separate opinions, whether 
concurring or dissenting, have been filed in the course of 
adjudication by judges serving on international courts and 
tribunals.  Figure 1 employs data from a variety of sources to show 
the rates at which separate opinions were filed for six prominent 
international judicial bodies: the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”),107 the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”),108 the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”),109 the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”),110 the Iran-United 

106 See R. P. Anand, The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in 
International Adjudication, 14 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 788, 788 (1965) (noting that in the 
first twenty years of the ICJ’s existence, “of the twenty-nine judgments or orders 
delivered by the [ICJ] in twenty-one contentious cases since 1945, only four 
judgments were unanimous, and out of twelve advisory opinions handed over 
during this period only one opinion was given by an undivided Court”) (internal 
citations omitted).  
107 The ICJ data is from a dataset collected by Eric Posner & Miguel de 
Figuerideo of the seventy-six cases heard by the ICJ through 2003 where judges 
voted on “substantive issues.”  Eric A. Posner & Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, Is the 
International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 599, 605 (2005).  For the 
complete dataset, see International Court of Justice, INT’L COURTS DATA, 
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/ICdata_files/Page580.htm (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2012) (click on “data” hyperlink to download).  
108 The ECJ has not had a single dissenting opinion filed to date.  See Vlad 
Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 309 
(2009) (“The ECJ finds itself alone among supranational and international courts 
and one of only a handful of national apex courts that bans its judges from writing 
concurring or dissenting opinions.”). 
109 The ECtHR data is based on Erik Voeten’s dataset collected from the 1,163 
cases heard between 1960 and 2006 that were deemed by the ECtHR to be of the 
highest level of importance.  The cases in “importance level 1 are deemed to make 
a significant contribution to the development of case law.”  Erik Voeten, supra 
note 79, at 425.  For the complete dataset, see European Court of Human Rights, 
INT’L COURTS DATA, 
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/ICdata_files/Page364.htm (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2012) (click on “SPSS” or “STATA” hyperlink to download in 
different formats). 
110 The ICSID data was collected by the authors.  The rate is based on twenty-
two separate opinions filed in the 330 publicly available ICSID decisions and 
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States Claims Tribunal (“IUSCT”),111 and the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”).112  As a point of comparison, Figure 1 also 
includes data on the United States Supreme Court (“US SC”)113 and 
Federal Courts of Appeals (“US COA”).114  The figure reports the 
percent of decisions that include at least one separately filed 
dissenting or concurring opinion for the sample analyzed for each 
court.  
 

awards.  The list of decisions is available at Search Online Decisions and Awards, 
ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= 
CasesRH&reqFrom=Main&actionVal=OnlineAward (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
111 The IUSCT data was collected by the authors.  The rate is based on twenty 
separate opinions filed in the 133 published IUSCT decisions through 2004.  The 
list of decisions is available at General Documents: Tribunal Awards and Decisions, 
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, http://www.iusct.net/Pages/Public/A-
Documents.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
112 The WTO data was collected by Meredith Kolsky Lewis.  It shows that, of 
105 panel decisions made through 2006, only six dissenting opinions have been 
filed.  See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 895, 899 nn.15–20 (2006) (listing the WTO cases in which 
dissenting opinions have been filed). 
113 The United States Supreme Court data is based on the decisions issued in 
the 2005 through 2010 terms.  During this period, the Supreme Court issued 476 
decisions, of which 336 had either concurrences or dissents filed.  The data was 
collected from the Harvard Law Review Statistics 2006–2011.  See The Statistics, 
The Supreme Court, 2010 Term, 125 HARV. L. REV. 362, 367 (2011); The Statistics, The 
Supreme Court, 2009 Term, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411, 416 (2010); The Statistics, The 
Supreme Court, 2008 Term, 123 HARV. L. REV. 382, 387 (2009); The Statistics, The 
Supreme Court, 2007 Term, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 521 (2008); The Statistics, The 
Supreme Court, 2005 Term, 120 HARV. L. REV. 372, 377 (2006).  For an analysis of 
Supreme Court decisions that looks only at dissent rates and not concurrences, see 
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges 
Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 106, 106 n.9 
(2011) (finding that between 1990 and 2007, there was a dissent rate of 62 percent 
in Supreme Court cases). 
114 The Court of Appeals data is based on 339 cases with dissents or 
concurrences in the sample of 2160 cases in the “U.S. Court of Appeals database” 
heard between 1997 and 2002.  For the complete dataset, see U.S. Court of Appeals 
Database Project, http://www.wmich.edu/nsf-coa/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2012) 
(click on “Court of Appeals Database” hyperlink for download options).  It is 
important to note that this dataset is not taken from the total universe of cases 
heard during this time period, but instead samples cases from each circuit to 
facilitate cross-circuit analysis.  For another analysis of dissents, excluding 
concurrences, in the United States courts of appeals, see Epstein, Landes, & 
Posner, supra note 113 (finding that there was a 2.6 percent dissent rate in courts 
of appeals between 1990 and 1970, and a 7.8 percent dissent rate between 1989 
and 1991 based on a separate analysis of a sample of 1,025 published decisions). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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As Figure 1 shows, although there is a great deal of variance, 
judges and arbitrators on many international bodies can and do file 
separate opinions.115  On the extremes, the ICJ had at least one 
separate opinion filed in 95% of contentious cases through 2003, 
while the European Court of Justice has never delivered an opinion 
that was not unanimous.  Additionally, although the jurists 
presiding over cases brought before ICSID and the WTO have only 
issued separate opinions in 7% and 5% of cases, respectively, the 
ECtHR (53%) and IUSCT (23%) both have fewer unanimous 
opinions than the United States Courts of Appeals (16%).  
Moreover, these often are very fractured decisions with multiple 
concurrences and dissents, conditions that are conducive to 

115 It is worth noting that many domestic courts in other countries do not 
allow dissenting opinions.  See, e.g., HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 67 (1982) (“In some countries, 
such as Belgium, France and Germany, only one judgment is delivered and there 
is no indication whether the judgment is given unanimously or by majority.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
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doctrinal paradox.116  The important takeaway is that judges in 
transnational courts often hold differing views in a case, and that if 
the doctrinal paradox is a concern to scholars of jurisprudence in 
the United States, international scholars should also take note of 
the possibility of this phenomena occurring. 
A second reason that the doctrinal paradox might be likely to 
occur in international settings is that judges may have divergent 
views on issues because of the possibility of relationships between 
the judges and litigants that do not exist in domestic settings.  One 
unique feature of international law is that treaties establishing 
international courts and tribunals often explicitly allow judges to 
hear cases in which their home country is a litigant.  For example, 
Article 31 of the ICJ Statute provides: “Judges of the nationality of 
each of the parties shall retain their right to sit in the case before 
the Court.”117  Moreover, the Statute also explicitly provides that a 
country appearing before the court may appoint a judge to the 
panel deciding its case if no judge of its nationality is already 
present.118  Of course, judges in domestic settings may hear cases in 
which they have preexisting biases, but in the international setting, 
steps are taken to guarantee participation in cases where the judge 
may have a strong potential for bias.  Emerging empirical research 
suggests this does in fact occur: judges are biased towards the 
countries that appoint them.  For example, Eric Posner and Miguel 
de Figueiredo have presented evidence of judges voting to support 
their home countries at the ICJ,119 and Erik Voeten has presented 
evidence to suggest that there are similar biases towards a judge’s 
home country in the European Court of Human Rights.120  This is 
perhaps unsurprising since judges often serve for relatively short 

116 See, e.g., K. R. Simmonds, The Interhandel Case, 10 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 495 
(1961) (providing an example of a contentious decision argued in the International 
Court of Justice). 
117 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 31, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 3 Bevans 1179. 
118 Id. (“If the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of 
the contesting parties, each of these parties may proceed to choose a judge as 
provided in paragraph (2) of this Article.”). 
119 See Posner & Figueiredo, supra note 107, at 601 (using “sophisticated 
empirical tests . . . to show that, in fact, judges are significantly biased in favor of 
their home states when that state appears as a party” before the ICJ).  
120 See Voeten, supra note 79, at 417 (“There is some evidence that career 
insecurities make judges more likely to favor their national government when it is 
a party to a dispute.”).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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terms on international courts, and their career interests make it 
necessary to stay in the good graces of the governments and actors 
that appointed them.121  It is worth noting that this feature of 
international adjudication is not entirely without merit, as it helps 
ensure that countries are willing to submit to the jurisdiction of 
international courts.  That said, the implication of national bias by 
judges is that, compared to domestic settings, there is an increased 
possibility that international judges on multi-member courts will 
have divergent views on how cases should be resolved in both the 
component issues and the final outcome.  
A third reason that international adjudication is fertile ground 
for the doctrinal paradox is that, although the density of 
international law is increasing, in many areas international law still 
remains under-developed.  As previously noted, there has been a 
dramatic proliferation in the number of international judicial 
courts and tribunals in the last sixty years.122  At the same time, 
there has been a proliferation of international laws,123 as the 
expansion of international institutions has led to a corresponding 
growth in the legislative and regulatory activities that these 
organizations undertake.124  The result is an increasingly complex 
web of laws governing a range of international interactions, 
including entirely new areas that were previously untouched by 
international law.125  International courts and tribunals are thus 

121 See Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification—The Agency 
Problem, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 333, 337 (2002) (“Knowing that they can be replaced, the 
members of the [international courts and tribunals] have an incentive not to do 
anything that will upset the countries with nominating authority.”).  
122 See supra text accompanying notes 77–81 (indicating that international 
courts have multiplied and gained more prominence since World War II); see also 
Symposium, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 
31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 679 (1999) (investigating the different factors leading to 
the proliferation of international judicial bodies and the implications of having 
numerous international courts).  
123 See, e.g., William Ewald, The Complexity of Sources of Transnational Law: 
United States Report, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 59, 63–66 (2010). 
124 Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International 
Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 35 (2008) (noting that international 
institutions “increasingly engage in a variety of legislative and regulatory 
activities”).  
125 See, e.g., Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 322 (2011) (discussing international law’s increasing emphasis to 
regulate individuals); CHRISTINA L. DAVIS, WHY ADJUDICATE? ENFORCING TRADE 
RULES IN THE WTO (forthcoming 2012) (enumerating a variety of ways that global 
trade law has become more complex); Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors 
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charged with interpreting and applying a dizzying body of 
international law that comes from a range of domestic and 
international sources.  The judges on these courts, however, have 
relatively little precedent to help guide their decisions as they 
wade into uncharted areas of international adjudication.  Judges 
therefore may find it difficult to determine which component 
issues are critical to decide en route to a final judgment, which 
impacts judgment aggregation if the judges choose to employ 
issue-based voting.126  In addition, even if the judges can easily 
agree on which legal and factual issues they should be deciding as 
part of a case, there are fewer previous cases to guide them on how 
they should rule on the various issues.  The result is that, with few 
precedents and messy law to guide judgments, it is likely that the 
judges will have a wide distribution of views on any given issue.  
The lack of precedent thus directly affects the likelihood that the 
distribution of votes in a case will result in the occurrence of the 
doctrinal paradox.   
A fourth reason that international judicial bodies may facilitate 
the occurrence of the doctrinal paradox is that the procedures of 
international courts are often still poorly developed.  Given how 
rapidly many of these courts have been created and how 
infrequently many have been used, a large number of international 
courts and tribunals remain “in their early stages of 
development.”127  Notably, this is true of the procedures that the 
courts use to decide contentious cases.  As a result, when 
contentious situations arise in international courts—when there are 
divergent majorities for the different propositions that the court 
has to consider—there is unlikely to be established policies for 
refereeing the disputes.  Thus, if the conditions that create the 
doctrinal paradox do arise, international courts are particularly 
unlikely to have thought through how best to evaluate the various 
sub-issues pertinent to the decision and then decide on an overall 
outcome to the case.  This stands in contrast to domestic courts of 
appeals in the United States, where internal policies and 

and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty Arbitration System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 
(forthcoming 2013) (on file with the authors) (discussing the evolution of 
international investment law). 
126 See infra Section 5.1 (examining the merits of flexible aggregation 
procedures in resolving the doctrinal paradox). 
127 Alter, supra note 79, at 3. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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procedures for deciding cases have evolved over decades.  In other 
words, these infant institutions are susceptible to indeterminate 
decision-making procedures because they lack clear policies for 
consistent judgment aggregation.  
3.3. Resolving Indeterminacy in International Adjudication 
As we have argued, the conditions necessary for the doctrinal 
paradox to occur are present in a range of transnational judicial 
bodies.  If the doctrinal paradox were to occur, however, it does 
not mean that the court would fail to reach a decision.  Instead, 
when cases give rise to the doctrinal paradox in an international 
court or tribunal that does not have a formal judgment aggregation 
policy,128 the judges on the court are left with one of two options.  
The first option is that the court could adopt an ad hoc policy to 
resolve the case each time the doctrinal paradox occurs.  The 
second option is that courts could implement a de facto judgment 
aggregation system that the members of the court have either 
explicitly or implicitly adopted.  In this option, the members of the 
court may or may not be aware that they have selected a judgment 
aggregation policy, and instead simply always defer to one of the 
two judgment aggregation methods.  Both of the two options have 
advantages and disadvantages that should be considered by the 
diplomats, scholars, and activists that design international legal 
institutions.   
Although it may appear on its face that adopting an ad hoc 
aggregation system when the doctrinal paradox arises is the 
simplest approach, doing so does have associated costs that should 
be considered.  In any setting, whether domestic or international, 
allowing judges to form ad hoc decisions on how to aggregate 
decisions after a paradoxical result raises concerns.129  The obvious 
concern is that by failing to have a consistent judgment 
aggregation policy, there is a possibility that like cases might not 
be treated alike.  In other words, if the exact same set of facts were 
to appear in front of the same set of judges in the future, the result 

128 See supra text accompanying notes 99–105 (arguing that the major 
permanent international courts and tribunals do not have formal judgment 
aggregation policies that were established by treaties); see also Appendix, infra. 
129 For a discussion of proposals that suggest a form of ad hoc voting, see 
infra Section 5.3. 
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of the case could be different if the judgment aggregation system 
were not consistent over time.130 
In international settings, however, there is another factor 
associated with ad hoc policymaking that should also be 
considered.  Previous scholarship on international institutions has 
noted that both formal and informal policies and norms often 
develop in international bodies.131  This scholarship argues that 
international organizations have a myriad of explicitly stated and 
negotiated formal rules that govern the operation of those 
institutions.  In addition to these formal rules, there are often also 
informal rules that are not part of the official standard operating 
procedure of the organization.  Although there are certainly 
advantages to having two parallel sets of rules governing 
international institutions, informal rules “allow exceptional access 
for powerful states to set the agenda and control particular 
outcomes.”132  In other words, when there is not an explicit policy 
on the books for how to resolve an issue, powerful actors are 
frequently able to exercise influence to ensure that their views are 
given primacy.133   
This feature of international organizations poses the risk of 
biasing outcomes in favor of powerful countries if courts adopt an 

130 See Kornhauser, supra note 41, at 12 (arguing that treating similar cases 
alike “imposes a consistency requirement on judicial decisions” and “reason-
giving promotes this consistency by characterizing each case and identifying the 
legally relevant aspects of similarity across cases”).  
131 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422–23 (2000) (arguing that norms serve as a form 
of soft international law that is often preferable to hard international law codified 
through legalization); Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International 
Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 762 (2001) (stating that while norms play an 
important role in international organizations, these organizations are primarily 
shaped by the interests of states).  See generally RANDALL W. STONE, CONTROLLING 
INSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY xi (2011) 
(developing a theory of informal governance to explain “essential features of the 
politics of diverse international organizations”). 
132 STONE, supra note 131, at 13.  See also Randall W. Stone, The Scope of IMF 
Conditionality, 62 INT’L ORG. 589, 590 (2008) (developing a theory of informal rules 
in the International Monetary Fund where “formal rules . . . embody consensual 
procedures, and informal rules . . . allow exceptional access for powerful 
countries”).   
133 For a discussion of the benefits of having formal and informal 
international agreements in the context of international organizations, see 
generally Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organizations: 
The Operational Constitution and Its Critics, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 209 (2009).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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ad hoc policy when confronted with cases that fit the doctrinal 
paradox.  Formal rules dictate the number of judges on courts, the 
selection mechanism to choose those judges, and the scope of the 
court’s jurisdiction.134  How to aggregate a judgment in the absence 
of an established policy when a paradoxical result has occurred, 
however, is an informal decision.  Therefore, it matters that power 
in international courts is not evenly distributed,135 and allowing 
this ad hoc decision process by a tribunal introduces a new way by 
which powerful states have the potential to influence the outcomes 
of international adjudication.136  In other words, even if every 
aspect of a case were fairly and impartially decided, if it leads to 
the doctrinal paradox, powerful states may be more likely to have 
the ultimate disposition of the case go their way when there is not 
a formal judgment aggregation rule on the books.  
Given the costs associated with the ad hoc policy described 
above, it is tempting to conclude that option two, the consistent 
implementation of a specific judgment aggregation policy, is the 
better policy.  Unfortunately, this policy has drawbacks as well.  
For one reason, there are tradeoffs associated with the different 
judgment aggregation methods when a doctrinal paradox arises.137  
For example, using issue-based voting might expend greater 
resources while using outcome-based voting might produce less 
useful precedent.  The concern with the court deciding how to 
weigh these tradeoffs on an informal basis is that even if the choice 
made is the same as the one that diplomats would have negotiated 
in advance, there is good reason to think that there is a troubling 
democratic deficit in international organizations.138  Since adopting 
a judgment aggregation mechanism might have predictable 
implications for future litigation before the court, regardless of the 
policy adopted, it could still be troubling if members of the court 

134 For a discussion of the formal rules of international courts and tribunals, 
see generally Romano, supra note 1.  
135 Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 
VA. J. INT’L L. 631, 634 (2005) (“The ability to constrain international courts is 
differentially distributed in the international system, so that more powerful states 
are able to exercise greater control over tribunals.”).  
136 Stone, supra note 81, at 58 (“International courts act strategically to protect 
their long-term influence, so they accommodate powerful interest groups.”).  
137 See infra Sections 5.1 and 5.2 
138 For an overview of the “democratic deficit” debate in international 
relations, see generally Andrew Moravcsik, Is there a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World 
Politics? A Framework for Analysis, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 336 (2004).  
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chose to adopt the policy without the potential for direct 
deliberation by the states that would be subject to the jurisdiction 
of the court.  
3.4. The Consequences of Indeterminacy in International Adjudication 
As we have argued, insufficient attention has been paid to the 
possibility of the doctrinal paradox occurring in international 
settings.  Moreover, there are numerous reasons to believe that the 
conditions necessary for the doctrinal paradox occur in 
international adjudication, and allowing international courts and 
tribunals to decide between two defensible outcomes creates 
problems that are not present in domestic settings.  This is true for 
at least two reasons.  First, in international adjudication, states 
have the ability to refuse to comply with judicial decisions, an 
option that is not as readily available in domestic settings where 
the executive and judicial branch can enforce decisions.  Second, 
international legal decisions have a particularly important role in 
communicating and establishing the corpus of international law. 
The first reason that the doctrinal paradox is a greater threat to 
judicial adjudication in international settings than in domestic 
settings is that litigants are often able to refuse to comply with 
international courts’ judgments.139  Trying to determine the rates at 
which states comply with international legal obligations has been a 
source of major debate over the last twenty years.140  In the face of 
this debate, legal scholars have put forward numerous theories to 
explain why states may or may not choose to comply with 
international law when they feel that the action required to comply 
with the judgment is not in their immediate interest.141  One of the 

139 See Ginsburg, supra note 135, at 660 (“States in some cases simply can 
ignore the decision of an international court.”).  
140 Compare Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 
INT’L ORG. 175, 204 (1993) (arguing that noncompliance is a deviant behavior and 
for a de-emphasis on formal enforcement of international agreements), with 
George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About 
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 379–80 (1996) (rejecting scholars’ claims that high 
compliance rates is evidence that enforcement is not the best means of obtaining 
compliance with international agreements).  For a general discussion of the 
contours of this debate, see Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International 
Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002). 
141 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 97 (exploring many theories 
behind compliance with international law, such as state interest and moral 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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prominent explanations holds that states use non-compliance with 
international judicial decisions to express their displeasure with 
the judgments with which they disagree.142  Moreover, there is a 
growing collection of empirical literature using quantitative 
methods to analyze compliance with a range of issues in 
international law, including international economic agreements,143 
human rights law,144 environmental regulations,145 and the laws of 
war.146  Of course, in the case of international adjudication, it is 

obligation); Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, 31 
YALE J. INT’L L. 189, 191 (2006) (claiming that by “reconciling formal legal 
prescriptions with changing community policies or by bridging the enforcement 
gap created by inadequate community mechanisms of control” states commit 
“operational noncompliance”—formally breaching international law but 
preserving a partially effective regime); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based 
Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823 (2002) (arguing that rational, self-
interested states comply with international law due to concerns over their 
reputation amongst other states); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997) (“[T]his overlooked process of 
interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international norms into 
domestic legal systems is pivotal to understanding why nations ‘obey’ 
international law . . . .”).  
142 See Ginsburg, supra note 135, at 660 (noting that when a state ignores the 
decision of an international court, that it “is at bottom a communicative act 
expressing displeasure with a court ruling”).  
143 See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment 
and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000) 
(showing that reputational concerns and competitive market pressures serve as a 
more effective form of generating compliance with international economic 
agreements); Beth A. Simmons, Money and Law: Why Comply with the Public 
International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 323 (2000) (demonstrating that 
states comply with the public international law of money to increase international 
trade, which allows the market to serve as an effective enforcement mechanism). 
144 See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) (using case studies and statistical analysis to 
show that human rights practices improve following the ratification of human 
rights treaties); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 
111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1939 (2002) (analyzing 166 nations over forty years and 
determining that noncompliance with human rights treaties is common).  
145 See, e.g., Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 
59 INT’L ORG. 363 (2005) (presenting findings regarding the effects of domestic 
constituency on the compliance decisions of governments under the auspices of 
the European acid rain regime).  
146 See James D. Morrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War?, 101 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 559, 561 (2007) (finding that treaty ratification increases compliance with 
the laws of war for democratic but not autocratic nations); Benjamin Valentino et 
al., Covenants Without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in 
Times of War, 58 WORLD POL. 339 (2006) (studying the effectiveness of international 
laws prohibiting attacks on civilians in times of war).  
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often extremely difficult to conclusively determine whether states 
are complying with court judgments.147  This is true for a variety of 
reasons, including the fact that states can simply ignore 
international courts in covert ways, that states may drag their feet 
for years before complying, or because there may be selection 
effects that limit the number of politically sensitive cases that reach 
courts.148  There is strong reason to believe, however, that courts 
frequently encounter difficulty in enforcing their judgments, as the 
rates of non-compliance described in the literature suggest.149  
Courts might also alter their decisions, seeking to avoid non-
compliance.150  Hence, an international tribunal’s vote distribution 
in a case might encourage its judges to justify a decision for one 
party—the very situation that arises in the doctrinal paradox.  If so, 
then the tribunal might choose an outcome aimed at minimizing 
the likelihood of non-compliance.  In other words, the court might 
decide for the party who threatens it most.  In extreme cases, a 
state could choose to exit if it believes that a tribunal reached its 
decision ad hoc and unfairly.151  Exit from international institutions 
is rare and an unlikely response to the doctrinal paradox.152  Still, 
the possibility for exit highlights how the stakes of indeterminacy 
during decision-making rise in international settings.  

147 See Posner & Yoo, supra note 77, at 28 (“[C]ompliance [with international 
courts] can be hard to observe . . . .”).   
148 See id.  
149 See LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 50–94 (2002) (arguing that European courts encounter difficulty enforcing 
their judgments).   
150 For an empirical analysis of the non-compliance phenomenon in the 
European Court of Justice, see Clifford J. Carrubba et al., Judicial Behavior under 
Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice, 102 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 435, 449 (2008) (“[T]hreats of noncompliance and legislative override induce 
courts to alter their decisions to mollify those political interests responsible for 
compliance and legislation.”); see also Clifford J. Carrubba, Courts and Compliance 
in International Regulatory Regimes, 67 J. POL. 669, 687 (2005) (discussing how 
“international courts can help overcome problems of enforcement in international 
agreements”).   
151 See Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 
48 VA. J. INT’L L. 411, 424 (2008) (“[A] State, having previously consented to a 
court’s jurisdiction or to a treaty regime, usually may exit.”).   
152 But see Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1602 (2005) 
(“[D]enunciations and withdrawals are a regularized component of modern treaty 
practice—acts that are infrequent but hardly the isolated or aberrant events that 
the conventional wisdom suggests.”).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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Another consequence of international cases that produce the 
doctrinal paradox is that their decisions do not effectively 
communicate information important to the development of 
international law.153  International courts and tribunals play a 
primary role disseminating information on international law, 
including to other courts and tribunals on how futures cases 
should be decided and to practitioners on how to advise states and 
litigants.154  The clearly articulated rationales of majority decisions 
and clarifications and arguments presented in separate and 
dissenting opinions provide the channels for such 
communication.155  This communication, however, loses usefulness 
when opinions are confusing because the decisions on component 
issues do not match the final judgment.  Scholars have expressed 
concern that such fragmentation hinders the development of 
international law.156  Examples of the doctrinal paradox create a 
problem for international courts because they risk creating unclear 
and unusable information for future courts and litigants.  These 
decisions confuse instead of clarify the corpus of international 
law.157  

153 Although legal precedents might peripherally affect civil law legal 
systems, they occupy central importance in common law countries.  Precedent is 
arguably of particular importance to international law because of the relatively 
few cases that result in judicial decisions.   
154 See GUZMAN, supra note 97, at 51 (“Recognizing that international courts 
serve almost exclusively to provide information changes the way one views and 
evaluates them.”).  
155 For an argument that dissenting and separate opinions serve an important 
role in generating discussion on international courts that shape future decisions 
and law, see CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
55–65 (2007); see also LAUTERPACHT, supra note 115, at 66 (“[T]he individual 
Opinions of the Judges . . . facilitate the fulfillment of the indirect purpose of the 
[ICJ], which is to develop and to clarify international law.”).  
156 See, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission, 58th sess, May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug 11, 2006, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 3, 2006) (Martti Koskenniemi) (detailing how 
erosion of general international law and increasingly specialized law-making lead 
to conflicts between rules and rule-making).  
157 Increasing uncertainty about the status and content of international law 
also risks increasing the number of cases that proceed to litigation.  Prior judicial 
rulings can help to clarify the likely disposition of legal disputes if they were to be 
litigated, but unclear rulings can increase uncertainty, thereby encouraging 
litigation.  
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4. THE PARADOX DURING INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
The staggering number of the different bodies and processes of 
international adjudication presents one of its most striking 
features.158  One of the most salient features of the doctrinal 
paradox is its occurrence in any collective decision-making body 
that is required to make multiple connected judgments.159  
Although previous scholarship glosses over the unique features of 
the different settings in which the paradox can occur, a full 
appreciation of its scope and implications necessitates examining 
these features more closely.  So the general features of the doctrinal 
paradox in international settings discussed in Section 3 will be 
focused in Section 4 on three increasingly important areas of 
international adjudication: human rights, adjudication of complex 
scientific issues, and arbitration.  By doing so, we hope to illustrate 
how the indeterminacy caused by the doctrinal paradox relates to 
scholars and practitioners working across different branches of 
international law.   
This Section proceeds in four parts.  First, we address how the 
doctrinal paradox can occur whether it is observable or not.  By 
highlighting this distinction, we are able to fully explain our 
approach for identifying examples of when there is a possibility of 
the doctrinal paradox occurring in international adjudication.  
Second, we describe a case from the European Court of Human 
Rights where the doctrinal paradox occurred.  This case illustrates 
how judges on the world’s most active international court issued 
judgments that led to a paradoxical result.  Third, we explain the 
increasing frequency with which international panels must make 
judgments that hinge on contested scientific information and how 
this can create difficulties in aggregating judgments or providing 
coherent case law for the future.  Given the complexity and 
uncertainty of the decisions made over multiple issues, the 
possibility exists that these conditions will lead to logically 
inconsistent outcomes.  Finally, we discuss how the adoption of 
new practices in international adjudication has created the 
opportunity for the doctrinal paradox to arise.  Although the 

158 For a survey of the different forms of international dispute settlement, see 
generally J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (5th ed. 2011).  
159 See List & Polak, supra note 19, at 442 (discussing judicial panels, multi-
member academic job-search committees, and scientific expert panels aggregating 
individual members’ preferences into collective decisions). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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policies of traditional arbitration panels made the doctrinal 
paradox unlikely, the creation of permanent arbitration panels like 
ICSID, which publishes dissenting opinions, makes such forums 
fertile grounds for indeterminate decision-making.   
4.1. Strategy for Locating the Doctrinal Paradox Internationally
Scholars interested in the doctrinal paradox face the challenge 
of showing that it is more than a mere possibility and actually 
appears in the decision-making of multi-member courts.  But even 
if a published decision makes clear that a different voting 
procedure would have produced a different decision, reading 
through the huge number of any court’s published decisions to 
identify the paradox poses practical difficulties. 
A more interesting challenge is that the doctrinal paradox often 
does not reveal itself in published decisions.160  Even if the 
distribution of judgments causes a doctrinal paradox, individual 
judges can obscure their opinions, concealing the paradox.  
Specifically, at least three reasons justify why the paradox likely 
passes unobserved even during judicial adjudication.  First, judges 
can change their votes on a component issue so that even if the 
distribution of judgments in a case would have created an 
indeterminate result, the published decision appears logically 
consistent across the issues and outcomes.  In the earlier examples 
of the doctrinal paradox on the U.S. Supreme Court, the paradox 
was observable because a judge explained that he changed his vote 
on the final outcome because he did not want the decision to be 
inconsistent with the votes of the individual issues addressed in 
the case.161  If, however, the judge changed his vote on a 
component issue instead of on the case’s outcome, it would have 
been impossible to discern that the doctrinal paradox had occurred 
during the decision-making process (unless the judge specifically 
explained his actions in a concurring opinion or it was later 
revealed when the Justice’s papers were released).   

160 Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note 43, at 748 
(“[C]onflict seldom is revealed in published appellate court opinions.  This is not 
surprising, however, because when courts engage in outcome voting, the judges 
in the majority typically do not reveal their views on issues that they ‘do not need 
to reach’ in order to vote for or against a particular outcome.”).  
161 See supra text accompanying notes 51–54.  
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Second, the doctrinal paradox might go unobserved because of 
great variation in the rate at which judges release dissenting or 
separate opinions.162  Third, judges facing the doctrinal paradox 
might not spend time dwelling on the quandary.  They might 
simply issue an opinion explaining how they agreed to resolve the 
case without discussing their different views on component 
issues.163   
The international context adds to these problems.  First, 
instances of the doctrinal paradox in international settings are 
difficult to locate and analyze even when observable since many 
tribunals issue complex and long decisions across formats, 
languages, and databases.  Second, international courts vary highly 
in whether they publish the justifications of their decisions and in 
whether dissents are issued in non-unanimous decisions.164  The 
lack of a clear statement of reasoning and of dissents makes it 
nearly impossible to identify instances of the doctrinal paradox.  
Indeed, even if researchers could readily access the decisions of 
every international tribunal, the doctrinal paradox is more likely to 
be unobserved internationally than in the U.S., where courts 
usually explain their reasoning and publish dissenting opinions. 
Hence, our strategy of identifying instances of the doctrinal 
paradox considers how it could arise within the specific contours 
of three different types of international adjudication.  For this 
effort, we selected forms of international adjudication that met 
three criteria.  First, the form of adjudication must be used 
frequently in international law.  Since many international 
adjudicatory bodies are seldom used, it makes sense to show how 
this paradox arises in the forums that actually have active dockets.  
Second, the issues must form part of an important and growing 
area of international law.  After all, the stakes of the doctrinal 
paradox would be minimal if it was only likely to occur during the 
adjudication of issues tangential to the core of the international 
legal project.  Third, we discuss forms of adjudication that cover a 
wide range of legal issues.  By examining the selected cases, we 
demonstrate that the doctrinal paradox poses implications for legal 

162 See supra text accompanying notes 106–116. 
163 See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 12 (“Judges who have 
encountered the doctrinal paradox in the course of their collective adjudicative 
efforts have barely paused to reflect on their quandary.”). 
164 See supra Sections 3.1 and 3.2; see also Appendix, infra.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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scholars and practitioners interested in topics ranging from human 
rights to environmental protection to investor protection.  Through 
the discussion of three distinct methods of dispute settlement, we 
show that the doctrinal paradox should be both of general interest 
and practical importance to many aspects of international 
adjudication.  
4.2. Permanent International Courts 
It would be reasonable to believe that the doctrinal paradox is 
more likely to occur on a very active court; in international 
adjudication, the most active court is the European Court of 
Human Rights (“ECtHR”).165  The ECtHR is a transnational court 
that hears suits brought by individual plaintiffs claiming that their 
government violated one or more of their rights protected by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“European Convention on Human Rights”) of 1950.166  
Although, of the tremendous number of suits filed with the Court, 
the majority are dismissed before reaching argument, the seven 
percent of cases that reach trial are heard by a panel of seven 
judges, including a judge from the country of the plaintiff who 
brought the case.167  The panel then issues a decision, which may 
include dissents, and a detailed explanation of the judges’ 
reasoning.  Since the ECtHR has issued more than seven thousand 
opinions through this process, the court has become one of the 
most respected international legal institutions.168  

165 See Voeten, supra note 2, at 671 (the ECtHR “has by far the largest caseload 
of any international court”).  
166 See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 14, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].  For an 
excellent and concise summary on the ECtHR, see Voeten, supra note 79, at 418–
19.  Note that “a few interstate cases” have been brought in the ECtHR.  Id. at 418, 
n.5.  
167 See id. at 419.  
168 See Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: 
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 125, 125 (2008) (“The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is 
the crown jewel of the world’s most advanced international system for protecting 
civil and political liberties.”); see also id. at 126 (“[T]he Convention and its growing 
and diverse body of case law have transformed Europe’s legal and political 
landscape, qualifying the ECtHR as the world’s most effective international 
human rights tribunal.”). 
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The decision in Fretté v. France, issued by the ECtHR, meets the 
conditions of the doctrinal paradox.169  The case concerned whether 
a French court’s decision to uphold the denial of an adoption by a 
single gay man violated his right of equal treatment under the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  Although the court had 
to decide several issues in making its final determination, the core 
controversy surrounded two issues.  The first issue concerned 
whether Article 14 of the Convention applied.  Article 14 provides 
that the “enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
. . . .”170  If Article 14 applied, the second issue addressed whether 
the decision to deny the plaintiff the right to adopt constituted 
discrimination.  A “yes” to both questions was necessary to issue a 
finding that the French government had violated the plaintiff’s 
rights under the Convention.  
 
Fretté v. France 
 Article 14 
Applicable? 
Discrimination? Violation of 
Article 14? 
Bratza Yes Yes Yes 
Costa No Not Decided No 
Fuhrmann Yes Yes Yes 
Jungwiert No Not Decided No 
Kuris Yes No No 
Traja No Not Decided No 
Tulkens Yes Yes Yes 
Outcome 4 – 3 3 – 1 3 – 4 
The decision in Fretté ultimately concluded that Article 14 of 
the Convention did apply, but that that case did not exhibit 

169 Fretté v. France, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. 438 (2002).  In an article on the adoption 
laws of the European Union, George Letsas mentions this case as an example of 
the doctrinal paradox.  George Letsas, No Human Right to Adopt?, 1 UCL HUM. RTS. 
REV. 134, 137 (2008). 
170 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 14 (“The enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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discrimination constituting a violation of Article 14.171  The 
outcome thus found for the defendant, the French government.  
Only a single judge, however, adopted this reasoning.  Judge Kuris 
wrote the opinion for the court, explaining the reasoning behind its 
decision, but three judges then signed two other opinions.  An 
interesting result ensued because the three judges who agreed with 
Judge Kuris that Article 14 was applicable also voted that Fretté’s 
treatment constituted discrimination.  Therefore, France, the 
defendant state, prevailed because the three judges who found that 
Article 14 did not apply chose not to address the second issue.172  
Fretté then resembles the previously discussed Supreme Court case 
Arizona v. Fulminante, in which Judge Souter chose not to decide 
two of the issues of the case.173  As in Fulminante, it is impossible to 
say with certainty what would have happened in Fretté if all seven 
judges had voted on each issue.  As it stands, the Fretté decision 
does not correspond to the distribution of the votes on each 
component issue.  In other words, the members of the court 
applied outcome-based voting to resolve this case.   
The partially concurring opinion in Fretté recognized the 
decision’s peculiarity.  Writing for himself and two other judges 
who found that Article 14 did not apply, Judge Costa noted: “The 
fundamental paradox of this judgment seems to [be] that it would 
have been easier to justify the rejection of the complaint on the 
legal basis of the inapplicability of Article 14 than to declare Article 
14 applicable and then find no breach of it.”174  Interestingly, Judge 

171 See Fretté, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 459 [¶ 43] (“[T]he justification given by the 
Government appears objective and reasonable and the difference complained of is 
not discriminatory for the purposes of Art.14 of the Convention.”). 
172 The Partly Concurring Opinion of these three judges notes the difficulty in 
resolving whether the adoption denial constituted discrimination, but does not 
attempt to conclusively do so because it is unnecessary to determine the final 
disposition.  See id. at 463–466 (partly concurring opinion of Judge Costa joined by 
Judges Jungwiert and Traja).   
173 See supra text accompanying notes 53–55; see also Kornhauser & Sager, 
supra note 17, at 15 n.36 (stating that when discussing Fulminante, “[o]ne has to 
speak in this speculative voice because Justice Souter, curiously, cast an 
incomplete roster of votes.  He supported the view that the confession was 
voluntary, and joined in the conclusion that the harmless error doctrine applied to 
the admission of coerced confessions, but he did not take a position on the 
question of whether the error in Fulminante would have been harmless and did 
not vote on the outcome of the case.”). 
174 See Fretté, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 466 [¶ O-I18] (partly concurring opinion of 
Judge Costa joined by Judges Jungwiert and Traja).   
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Costa was the French judge,175 and the majority of the judges 
disagreed with him on this point, finding that Article 14 did apply.  
However, the outcome Judge Costa supported—a finding for the 
French government—was the ultimate decision of the court.  
Although there is empirical evidence that suggests that judges on 
the ECtHR are more likely to support their home government,176 
there is no evidence that the result of this case was due to bias 
towards France on the part of the panel of judges.  That said, the 
case does illustrate that the doctrinal paradox can lead to 
indeterminacy on the international stage.  It also highlights that 
having a judge appointed by the defending national government 
on the panel raises the possibility that a decision will appear 
political in a way that it could not in domestic contexts.  
4.3. Scientific Decision-Making by International Panels 
Another area where the doctrinal paradox may appear in 
international adjudication is in the context of cases in which 
scientific information must be considered.177  As the complexity 
and density of international laws and regulations have grown, 
international adjudicatory bodies have increasingly been called on 
to make decisions that involve scientific questions.178  This trend 
has forced international adjudicatory bodies to evaluate 
sophisticated scientific evidence on topics ranging from how 
specific genetically modified organisms impact food safety and 
health to the implications that various pollutants have on global 
climate change.179  The scientific questions that courts are forced to 
consider are often not single discrete points, but instead require 
issuing a series of connected judgments on a number of related 

175 See Judges of the Court Since 1959, EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/4DE51198-3FDF-4CD5-82D1-
1704E49A57AB/0/Liste_des_juges_depuis1959_EN.pdf (last accessed Oct. 17, 
2012).  
176 See Voeten, supra note 79, at 428 (observing the situations where judges 
show bias towards their home countries).   
177 See, e.g., List & Polak, supra note 19, at 442 (“[C]onsider an expert panel 
that is asked to give advice on a set of complex scientific questions.”).  
178 See Sungjoon Cho, From Control to Communication: Science, Philosophy, and 
World Trade Law, 44 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 249, 250 (2011) (“Recently, science has 
become increasingly salient in various fields of international law.”).  
179 See generally Andrew Green & Tracey Epps, The WTO, Science, and the 
Environment: Moving Towards Consistency, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 285 (2007) (exploring 
the World Trade Organization’s treatment of issues of “scientific uncertainty”).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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premises en route to reaching a final disposition for the case.  The 
result is that scientific decision-making by international courts and 
tribunals is fertile ground for the doctrinal paradox to arise.  
One of the primary reasons that scientific judgments by 
adjudicatory bodies are likely to give rise to the doctrinal paradox 
is that making scientifically grounded decisions often entails 
consideration of a number of related propositions.180  Take global 
warming as an example.181  To determine if global warming is 
occurring may require a consideration of the current base rate of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, whether the rate is increasing, 
the relation of atmospheric carbon dioxide and temperature, and 
whether that current increase translates into an increase in average 
temperature.  More broadly, making scientific determinations often 
requires evaluating different forms of scientific evidence across a 
range of topics before being able to make a final judgment on a 
larger scientific claim. 
One difficulty that confounds decision-making on scientific 
questions is that there are often substantial scientific uncertainties 
in the component issues.182  The nature of these uncertainties can 
vary from “risks” (which have a well understood probability 
distribution), to Knightian uncertainty (which prevents the 
assignment of probabilities over different outcomes), to complete 
ignorance (where the range of possible outcomes is not even 
known).183  As a consequence, even when using modern statistical 

180 Cf. JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE: A CASE STUDY IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 189 (1983) (discussing how decision-making on energy use 
requires making several related determinations). 
181 See Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Arrow’s Theorem in Judgment 
Aggregation, 29 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 19, 19–20 (2007) (using global warming as 
an example to illustrate the discursive dilemma).  
182 For a discussion of these issues of scientific uncertainty in the context of 
trade law, see Sungjoon Cho, Of the World Trade Court’s Burden, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
675, 678 (2009). 
183 For further discussion, see Vern Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming 
the “World Trans-science Organization”: Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and 
Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 255 (1998) 
(questioning the WTO’s combination of science and regulation).  See also JOHN 
HICKS, CAUSALITY IN ECONOMICS (1979); Paul Davidson, Some Misunderstanding on 
Uncertainty in Modern Classical Economics, in UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT 
21, 34 (Christian Schmidt ed., 1996) (advocating John Keynes’ approach to 
uncertainty which requires differentiating uncertainty from risk); Mark Perlman 
& Charles R. McCann Jr., Varieties of Uncertainty, in UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMIC 
THOUGHT, supra at 9, 17–18 (exploring sources of uncertainty and methods for 
resolving uncertainty). 
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techniques, scientific experts can arrive at wildly different 
estimates of the amount and impact of uncertainty in a particular 
scientific claim.184  Because the predicted point estimates may vary 
greatly across studies, the impact of differing methodological and 
normative assumptions that inform these analyses is quite high.  
Temporarily resolving risk, uncertainty, ignorance, and ambiguity 
for the purpose of making public policy or deciding legal claims 
thus necessarily requires making assumptions about the behavior 
of the physical world.185   
The result is that legal decisions requiring scientific judgments 
will inevitably face conditions favorable to the doctrinal paradox 
because there is the possibility of heterogeneous views on the 
resolution of the underlying scientific questions.  Simply put, even 
with the same information, experts with the same level of 
competence will come to different conclusions on scientific 
questions.  This problem is compounded, however, because the 
challenge that faces public policy makers and judges then is not 
just a function of the inherent indeterminacy of scientific inquiry, 
but also a function of the nature of public policy—there needs to be 
some sort of specificity and consistency in the reasons given for a 
particular policy or decision.  In the context of scientific evidence, 
this means that judges need to be able to articulate a clear set of 
mechanisms that can demonstrate that a causal process is 
underway, thus requiring a policy or legal intervention.  Moreover, 
in order for some form of harm to be established, there needs to be 
a demonstration that the mechanisms that generate the harm 
actually operate.  As a result, scientific cases that give rise to the 
doctrinal paradox are both possible, even when there is solid 

184 See, e.g., Andrew Stirling, Risk, Uncertainty and Precaution: Some 
Instrumental Implications from the Social Sciences, in NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHANGE: NEW PERSPECTIVES FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE 33 (Frans Berkhout et al. eds., 
2003) (discussing risk in environmental social science and finding precaution to be 
an instrumentality of risk); Andrew Stirling, Risk at a Turning Point?, 1 J. RISK RES. 
97, 97 (1998) (examining the subjectivity of comparative risk assessments and the 
consequent need for increased public participation in policy making); Andrew 
Stirling, Limits to the Value of External Costs, 25 ENERGY POL’Y 517, 517–18 (1997) 
(discussing the difficulties of energy risk analysis and its subjective findings). 
185 See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS 
POLICYMAKERS 9–12 (1990) (analyzing agencies’ growing dependence on scientists 
throughout the policy making process); Elster, supra note 180, at 185–207 (arguing 
that the risk and uncertainty inherent in energy production must be used as a 
basis for choice). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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scientific evidence on the issues in the case, and difficult to resolve, 
given the requirement that scientific decisions have logically 
consistent causal stories.  
The way that these concepts are emerging in international 
courts and tribunals is illustrated by the debate on the use of 
antibiotics in livestock.186  In addition to their use to treat sick 
animals (therapeutic use) and to prevent animals from becoming 
sick (prophylactic use), antibiotics can also be used at sub-
therapeutic levels to speed up the growth rates of livestock 
(antibiotic growth promoters, or AGPs).187  Despite these 
advantages of antibiotics, however, they may negatively affect 
public health by creating bacteria that are resistant to antibiotics.  
Determining whether a threat exists to public health hinges on 
multiple connected propositions; hence the possibility of judgment 
aggregation problems.  
To determine whether AGPs pose a threat to public health 
involves analysis of a number of component issues, including 
dose-response effects (creating a measure of the amount of 
resistance produced by using a certain amount of antibiotics), the 
effect of other antibiotics and biological phenomena present in 
empirical tests of a resistance link, and confirmation of transfer of 
resistance genes to resident human bacterial flora which then 
interfere in a therapeutic intervention for a human livestock 
consumer.  If a judge believes that the current use of antibiotics 
does produce substantial resistance levels but that it has not been 
shown to compromise human therapeutic intervention, then 
banning antibiotics on public safety grounds would clearly not be 
warranted.  

186 See generally J. J. Dibner & J. D. Richards, Antibiotic Growth Promoters in 
Agriculture: History and Mode of Action, 84 POULTRY SCI. 634 (2005) (discussing the 
various responses to the use of antibiotic growth promoter).   
187 See W. W. Cravens & G. L. Holck, Economic Benefits to the Livestock Producer 
and to the Consumer from the Use of Feed Additives, 31 J. ANIMAL SCI. 1102, 1102 
(1970) (examining the economic benefits arising from the use of feed additives); E. 
L. R. Stokstad & T. H. Jukes, Further Observations on the “Animal Protein Factor”, 73 
PROC. SOC’Y EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY & MED. 523, 527 (1950) (tracking the effects of 
different diets on animal growth rates); P. R. Moore et al., Use of Sulfasuxidine, 
Streptothricin, and Streptomycin in Nutritional Studies with the Chick, 165 J. BIOL. 
CHEM. 437, 440 (1946) (exploring the effect of sulfonamides on the nutritional 
vitamin requirements of chicks). 
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Beginning in 1997, the European Union (“EU”) began banning 
AGPs, and by 2006 their use was fully prohibited in Europe.188  
During this process, arguments on whether AGPs should be 
banned turned on the positions taken on these issues.  The EU’s 
Scientific Committee on Animal Nutrition (“SCAN”) argued that 
there was insufficient evidence that antibiotic-resistant bacteria in 
animals could be transferred to humans in a way that would 
spread resistance mechanisms.189  The EU’s Scientific Steering 
Committee (“SSC”), however, decided that transfer was at least 
possible.190  These divergent viewpoints reflected disagreement 
within the scientific community itself as to whether definitive 
demonstration of a biological mechanism is required to affirm a 
premise.  This disagreement on premises formed an important part 
of the challenges to the bans brought by economic interests in the 
EU’s Court of First Instance (renamed the General Court in 
November 2009).  Pfizer, the manufacturer of one of the banned 
antibiotics, Virginiamycin, based much of its argument on the need 

188 See Victoria F. Samanidou & Evaggelia N. Evaggelopoulou, 
Chromatographic Analysis of Banned Antibacterial Growth Promoters in Animal Feed, 31 
J. SEPARATION SCI. 2091, 2102 (2008) (listing various bans on antibiotics as growth 
promoters).   
189 See Opinion of the Scientific Comm. for Animal Nutrition on the Immediate and 
Longer-term Risk to the Value of Streptogramins in Human Medicine Posed by the Use of 
Virginiamycin as an Animal Growth Promoter (July 10, 1998), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/scan/out14_en.print.html (concluding that 
virginiamycin as a growth promoter does not present an immediate public health 
risk); Rep. of the Scientific Comm. for Animal Nutrition on the Use of Avilamycin in 
Feedingstuffs for Turkeys for Fattening, at 6 (Oct. 24, 1997), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/oldcomm6/antibiotics/52_en.pdf (finding that 
the use of avilamycin for fattening turkeys is acceptable). 
190 See Opinion of the Scientific Steering Comm. on Antimicrobial Resistance, at 75–
76 (May 28, 1999), available at http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out50_en.pdf 
(concluding that immediate efforts must be taken to reduce the overall use of 
antimicrobials).  It is worth noting that there continues to be a lively debate in 
scientific circles over whether the ban is justified and whether it is helpful or 
harmful to human health.  See, e.g., Peter Collignon, Antibiotic Growth Promoters, 54 
J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 272, 272 (2004) (highlighting the dangers of 
using antibiotics as growth promoters); Ian Phillips et al., Does the Use of 
Antibiotics in Food Animals Pose a Risk to Human Health? A Critical Review of 
Published Data, 53 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 28, 28 (2004) (acknowledging 
the possible harm of antibiotics on humans while demonstrating that the actual 
danger is small); John Turnidge, Antibiotic Use in Animals—Prejudices, Perceptions, 
and Realities, 53 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 26, 27 (2004) (discussing the need 
to control the spread of resistant bacteria). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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to evaluate each premise.191  The source of Pfizer’s argument, 
however, was the initial reports from SCAN.  Of course, 
disagreements over key scientific premises also form the crux of 
other important international debates, such as carbon emissions 
and global warming. 
While the potential for doctrinal paradoxes due to judgments 
about scientific information is present in domestic courts, the 
harms are magnified at the international level.  As scholars like 
Andrew Guzman have argued, the topics at the heart of scientific 
disputes are also at the core of any government’s obligations—
protecting the health and safety of its citizens.192  The impact is 
then not only that the process of making scientific decisions during 
international adjudication is likely to produce divergent judgments 
that could lead to the doctrinal paradox, but also that governments 
will face domestic pressures to not comply with international 
decisions based on uncertain scientific judgments.193  As 
international courts pass judgment on an increasing number of 
disputes based on scientific evidence, judgment aggregation 
problems could lead to controversial judgments that threaten the 
logical coherence of international law and diminish the legitimacy 
of their associated organizations because litigants feel that the 
scientific uncertainty provides even more political cover than usual 
to ignore the court’s decision.  
4.4. International Investment Arbitration  
Another corner of international adjudication where the 
conditions are present for the doctrinal paradox to create 
indeterminate decisions is international arbitration.  This growing 

191 Case T-70/99, Alpharma Inc. v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. II-3506 (stating the 
need for risk assessment of food additives before implementing bans while 
upholding the ban on bacitracin zinc); Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. 
Council, 2002 E.C.R. II-3318 (rejecting Pfizer’s arguments criticizing the Council’s 
risk assessment and upholding the ban on virginiamycin). 
192 See Andrew T. Guzman, Food Fears: Health and Safety at the WTO, 45 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 26 (2004) (“[T]he regulation of health and safety goes to the heart of 
national sovereignty.”).  
193 Id. at 10–11 (arguing in the case of WTO decisions regarding a treaty 
which allows states to adopt trade restrictions to protect plant, animal or human 
life, “[l]osing defendants will face strong pressures to resist compliance, making it 
more likely that a dispute will lead to a long-term standoff in which the losing 
defendant retains the measure and the winning complainant suspends 
concessions in response.”).  
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field of international law has been undergoing major 
transformations as new subject matters are covered by an 
increasing array of permanent arbitration panels.  The 
developments have not only changed the face of commercial 
arbitration, but also opened the door to the possibility of the 
doctrinal paradox occurring in a situation where the judges are 
poorly equipped to resolve an indeterminate decision.194   
This threat is a relatively recent development because the 
structure of traditional international arbitration previously made 
the occurrence of the kind of splits in judgment that would lead to 
the doctrinal paradox all but impossible.195  Traditionally, 
international arbitration took place by having each party to the 
dispute appointing a president (the third member of the panel), 
who would “enjoy a natural leadership which allows them to exert 
a dominant influence on co-arbitrators and bring them over to 
support the award.”196  The result was that dissenting opinions 
issued in international arbitration were rare.197  Instead, even if 
there was a true disagreement, the members of the panel would 
still draft a unanimous decision that tried to grapple with the 
troubling issues.198  The impact is that the traditional result of an 
international arbitration was that the president of the panel was 
largely able to get his or her way without having to grapple with 
discrepancies in the reasoning of the members of the panels.   

194 For an excellent discussion of the reasons that international arbitrators 
should begin to pay attention to the doctrinal paradox, see Manuel Conthe, 
Majority Decision in Complex Arbitration Cases: The Role of Issue-By-Issue Voting 
(2010), http://www.josemigueljudice-arbitration.com/xms/files/02_TEXTOS_ 
ARBITRAGEM/01_Doutrina_ScolarsTexts/awards/Majority_decisions_and_issu
e-by-issue_voting.pdf (examining how a final decision can be affected by the way 
voting is organized within the decision-making body). 
195 For background on international arbitration in the investment treaty 
arbitration context, see generally GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007) (exploring “the recently emerged system of 
investment treaty arbitration”).  
196 Conthe, supra note 194, at 9.  
197 See, e.g., Peter J. Rees & Patrick Rohn, Dissenting Opinions: Can they Fulfil a 
Beneficial Role?, 25 ARB. INT’L 329, 329–30 (2009) (claiming that the prevailing view 
is that dissenting opinions should be discouraged).  
198 See Alan Redfern, The 2003 Freshfields—Lecture Dissenting Opinions in 
International Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 20 ARB. INT’L 
223, 224 (2004) (noting that historically “[t]he expectation is that th[e] award will 
be unanimous”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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Over time, however, there has been an evolution in 
international arbitration that has opened the door to the possibility 
of decisions that result in voting patterns by tribunal members that 
are open to the possibility of indeterminate decisions.  The primary 
development that has helped pave the way for the possibility of 
the doctrinal paradox is that there has been a move towards 
allowing dissenting opinions in international arbitration.199  This 
development has sparked a debate in the international arbitration 
community.200  On the one hand, advocates have argued that 
allowing dissenting opinions forces the majority to take greater 
pains to craft carefully reasoned opinions that grapple with the 
tough questions raised by the dispute.201  Others have argued that 
the move to allow dissenting opinions has produced little value 
while creating a new avenue for arbitrators—who hope to be 
appointed to panels in the future—to grandstand.202  Regardless of 
the merits of the decision to allow dissenting opinions, this move 
has paved the way for the possibility of the doctrinal paradox 
occurring during the course of international arbitration.  
One forum that perhaps exemplifies the change in policies that 
have left the door open to the possibility of paradoxical voting 
patterns is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“ICSID”).  ICSID is an arm of the World Bank which was 
established to provide a forum for the resolution of international 
investment disputes between a state party to the ICSID Convention 
and a national of another state party.203  The rules governing ICSID 
create the conditions necessary to facilitate the doctrinal 

199 For a discussion of the historical development of the decision to allow 
dissenting opinions in international arbitration, see id. at 225 (“Dissenting 
opinions have come to international commercial arbitration as a gift of the 
common law.”). 
200 See generally Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-
Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS 
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 821 (Mahnoush H. 
Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010).   
201 See Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Dissenting Opinions in International 
Arbitration, 15 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 26, 30 (2000) (“[A] well-reasoned dissent 
can help ensure that the majority opinion deals with the most difficult issues 
confronting it.”). 
202 See Redfern, supra note 198, at 225 (“It is doubtful, however, whether the 
dissenting opinion has added much, if anything, of value to the arbitral process.”).  
203 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States art. 1(2), opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 
1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
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paradox.204  Specifically, the rules governing ICSID formally 
require that the panel publish a written opinion explaining the 
reasoning for each of the issues submitted to the panel, and not just 
a ruling on the overall judgment of the court.205  Additionally, 
arbitrators on ICSID panels have the explicit right to file a 
dissenting opinion to express their reasoning or thoughts on any 
aspect of the ruling.206  Although these conditions have not led to 
an observed example of the doctrinal paradox occurring in any of 
ICSID’s published decisions, in at least one case there were shifting 
majorities on the different issues decided.  In Duke Energy 
International v. Peru,207 two members of the panel filed partial 
dissenting opinions in which they each suggested one of the key 
issues in the case on which they disagreed with the majority.  
Moreover, in the dissenting opinions, the arbitrators were clear 
that they disagreed with aspects of the reasoning that led to the 
conclusion of the panel.208  The implication is that even if an 
observed or unobserved instance of the doctrinal paradox has not 
yet occurred, it is clear that all of the conditions are present and 
that arbitrators are willing to act in the way that makes it possible.  

204 See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 830–
34 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the evolution of the decision to allow dissents from 
ICSID decisions). 
205 See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Rules of 
Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), Rule 47(1)(i), Apr. 10, 
2006, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partF-chap06.htm 
(providing that an ICSID award shall be written and contain “the decision of the 
Tribunal on every question submitted to it, together with the reasons upon which 
the decision is based . . . .”).  
206 See id. Rule 47(3) (“Any member of the Tribunal may attach his individual 
opinion to the award, whether he dissents from the majority or not, or a statement 
of his dissent.”). 
207 See Duke Energy Int’l Peru Invs. No. 1, Ltd. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/28, Award, ¶ 141 (Aug. 18, 2008), 15 ICSID Rep. 100 (2010), 
available at http://italaw.com/documents/DukeEnergyPeruAward_000.pdf 
(identifying depreciation assessment and merger revaluation assessment as two 
key issues discussed by the tribunal). 
208 See Duke v. Peru, 15 ICSID Rep. (partial dissenting opinion of Arbitrator 
Dr. Guido Santiago Tawil), ¶ 1, available at http://italaw.com/documents/ 
DukeEnergyPeruAward_000.pdf (“I have concurred with my distinguished 
colleagues and fellow arbitrators in most of the issues discussed in the Award.  
Unfortunately, I am unable to join in their conclusions on two issues . . . .”); see 
also Duke v. Peru, 15 ICSID Rep. (partial dissenting opinion of Arbitrator Dr. Pedro 
Nikken), ¶ 1–3, available at http://italaw.com/documents/ 
DukeEnergyPeruAward_000.pdf (expressing his agreement with aspects of the 
majority reasoning, but dissenting on the estoppel issue related to the merger).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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5. RESOLVING THE PARADOX IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
We have argued that not only do features of international 
adjudication make the doctrinal paradox possible while potentially 
magnifying its impact, but also that there are a number of growing 
areas of international law where this dilemma may surface.  The 
question then becomes how the problem should be resolved.  
Unfortunately, there are no easy answers.  As we previously 
discussed in Section 2.4, there are tradeoffs associated with all 
approaches to judgment aggregation—issue-based voting, 
outcome-based voting, flexible approaches, or context-specific 
rules that incorporate both issue and outcome voting.  Flexible 
approaches give courts the freedom to consider the specifics of 
individual cases, but in so doing, create indeterminacy and the 
potential for accusations of unfairness.  Fixed-strategy approaches, 
on the other hand, may be less subject to cries of unfairness, but 
they force the court into decisions that may not be in its overall 
interest.  The stakes associated with these tradeoffs are particularly 
acute in international settings because courts must balance two 
crucial requirements: maintaining support of the states subject to 
their jurisdiction and producing logically sound and justifiable 
decisions.  As a result, analyzing the consequences of these 
tradeoffs for international adjudication is a worthwhile endeavor. 
To do so, this Section proceeds in four parts, each of which 
considers the pros and cons of one of the possible approaches to 
addressing the doctrinal paradox.  First, we discuss the advantages 
and drawbacks of maintaining maximally flexible policies, which 
allow international courts to exercise full discretion in disposing of 
cases as they arise.  This approach has the clear benefit of allowing 
the court to decide the best disposition for an individual case given 
the particular divergent views of the judges, but does so at the 
expense of consistency.  Second, we consider the virtues of the 
context-specific voting rules that have been proposed in the past.  
These policies create procedures for addressing the paradox, but 
give judges the opportunity to select between different judgment 
aggregation methods depending on the circumstances.  Third, we 
consider the impact of a fixed policy that employs issue-based 
voting.  Of particular salience for international law is that this 
method often creates more logically consistent precedent, but it 
may also drain judicial resources and introduce avenues for 
politicking into the decision-making process.  Fourth, we consider 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
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the problems associated with relying on outcome-based voting in 
international settings.  Since the major problem that has been 
identified with this method in domestic settings is that it creates 
less intelligible precedent, these concerns have particular force 
given that the corpus of international law is still in its infancy.  As 
we hope to show, each of these four approaches has both 
advantages and disadvantages that should be carefully weighed by 
those establishing judicial procedures to confront the problems 
identified by judgment aggregation theory.   
5.1. Flexible Aggregation Procedures in International Adjudication
One obvious approach that international courts and tribunals 
could take to respond to the doctrinal paradox is to implement a 
policy that gives judges maximal flexibility over how to aggregate 
judgments in any given situation.  This means that the court would 
have several options to consider in cases where the distribution of 
votes resulted in the doctrinal paradox.  One option is that the 
court could elect to use either issue-based or outcome-based voting 
to resolve the case, deciding the final outcome based on the 
method that they select.  Alternatively, the court could choose to 
hide the occurrence of the doctrinal paradox either by having 
judges change their votes—as Justice White chose to do in Union 
Gas and Justice Kennedy chose to do in Fulminante209—or by 
publishing a decision that was not sufficiently detailed to make the 
occurrence of the doctrinal paradox clear.  This policy, whether 
explicit or implicit, would ensure that the judges and arbitrators on 
international courts and tribunals would have complete freedom to 
decide how to confront the unique circumstances of each case that 
comes before them.   
This flexible approach, which is likely the status quo for many 
international legal institutions, presents several clear advantages.  
The first, and perhaps most important, is that by not having a set 
policy in advance, the judges have the flexibility to decide each 
case in the way that they think will best avoid hurting the 
legitimacy or long-term health of the court on which they serve.210  

209 See supra text accompanying notes 51–56 (discussing the increase of a 
doctrinal paradox in U.S. Supreme Court decisions).  
210 See Ginsburg, supra note 135, at 668 (“[S]trategic constraints, though less 
apparent in the international context than in domestic lawmaking, provide 
important limits on judicial discretion.”).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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Recall that the doctrinal paradox, even in domestic settings, makes 
a single, logically justified result impossible, which can be 
“embarrassing” for the court.211  In international settings, however, 
the problem goes deeper than mere embarrassment.  When judges 
issue decisions that states view as unfavorable or unjustifiable, it 
may result in the court being utilized less in the future.212 
One form of decision that litigants before international courts 
may find particularly troubling is if the court chooses to aggregate 
their votes in a way that leads a party to lose, when an alternative 
aggregation method would have led that same party to win.  
Furthermore, courts have additional incentives to make sure that, if 
there are “close calls,” they do not rule against powerful states 
with strong interests at stake in the case.213  As a result, the judges 
serving on international courts may have good reasons to either 
alter the voting to mask the doctrinal paradox, or alternatively, to 
aggregate the votes in a way that ensures the interests of powerful 
states are respected.  Having a flexible judgment aggregation 
policy that leaves voting up to the judges makes this possible.  
Another advantage of maintaining the status quo—of a flexible 
strategy—is that it is the only approach that does not require 
expending energy that could otherwise be directed toward other 
important international judicial reforms.  As the volume of cases 
brought before international judicial bodies has increased in recent 
years, there has been an attendant increase in pressure to make 
reforms.  For example, scholars have argued for the need to reform 

211 See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 34 (“The embarrassment is 
entirely the court’s: the divergence between reasons and outcome does not 
impugn the soundness of any specific judge’s decision.”); Rogers, supra note 9, at 
1013 (“Of course it may be embarrassing to the law that we have a rule that no 
individual reasoner could arrive at.”). 
212 See Posner & Yoo, supra note 77, at 21 (“In short, arbitrators or judges have 
an incentive to rule within the range of outcomes acceptable to the states—in 
other words, acting according to their instructions or according to the ex ante 
boundaries of cooperation—because such decisions make it more likely that they 
will be used again.”).  
213 See, e.g., Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and 
Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market, in IDEAS AND 
FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE, 173, 199–203 
(Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993) (arguing that the structure of 
the ECJ discourages it from issuing decisions that would not have widespread 
European Community support); see also id. at 62 n.239, 66 n.267 (discussing the 
incentives that ECJ judges have to not to deviate from strong preferences of  
powerful member states because the judges have renewable terms). 
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prominent international courts such as the ECtHR and the ICJ so 
that the courts can best cope with their increasing dockets.214  Since 
it can be difficult to make even uncontroversial reforms to 
international institutions, the process of reforming international 
courts and tribunals may require considerable time and effort.  As 
a result, leaving flexible procedures in place that allow judges to 
decide how to best aggregate votes in each individual case might 
be an especially appealing solution because it does not require 
expending capital on selecting and implementing a new strategy 
that could otherwise be directed to other judicial reform projects.  
Of course, as we have described in the foregoing Sections, 
maintaining a flexible strategy does have associated costs that 
should be of concern to international judicial bodies.  Paramount 
among these is the risk of creating decisions that will be perceived 
as illegitimate.  Without an aggregation rule established in 
advance, judges have yet another avenue allowing them to act 
politically.  And, as previously mentioned, in international 
settings, the incentive for judges to act politically when there are 
two justifiable outcomes is only magnified.  Although all of the 
judges on formally independent international courts are 
independent, there is evidence to suggest that the judges are 
responsive to the needs of the states that appointed them in order 
to secure reappointment or future career opportunities.215   
The impact of this bias is twofold.  First, even in the absence of 
explicit evidence, the perception of bias calls into question the 
validity and impartiality of decisions that are issued by 
international courts when the doctrinal paradox is observed.  

214 See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 168, at 126 (arguing that reform of the ECtHR is 
needed because “the EC[t]HR is becoming a victim of its own success and now 
faces a docket crisis of massive proportions”); see also Cecily Rose, Questioning the 
Silence of the Bench: Reflections on Oral Proceedings at the International Court of Justice, 
18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 47 (2008) (making the case for the need to reform the 
way that oral argument is conducted at the ICJ).  
215 See Roland Vaubel, Principal-Agent Problems in International Organizations, 1 
REV. INT’L. ORG. 125, 133 (2006) (“If the supervisory institution is a court, its 
members are supposed to be independent once they have been appointed.  This 
means that they should not take instructions from the governments which have 
nominated them.  However, if the judges may be reappointed . . . they may still be 
subservient to the government of their country.”); see also Posner & de Figueiredo, 
supra note 107, at 601 (discussing judges’ partiality in favor of their home state in 
judicial decision making); Voeten, supra note 79, at 417 (noting that judges are 
partial to their national governments when the government is a party in a dispute 
before the judge’s court). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/2
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Second, even when the doctrinal paradox is not observed, knowing 
that the judges do not have a fixed method of aggregation suggests 
that there is negotiation occurring behind the scenes.  Therefore, 
while maintaining complete flexibility has its advantages,216 the 
risks associated with this strategy at the international level may 
outweigh the advantages for doing so.  
5.2. Context-Sensitive Voting in International Adjudication
Another strategy that international adjudicatory bodies could 
adopt to address the doctrinal paradox is a context-specific method 
that changes based on the circumstances of the case.217  The 
difference between a completely flexible system, as described in 
Section 5.1 above, and a context-specific judgment aggregation 
method is that the latter imposes a fixed way to determine whether 
issue-based or outcome-based voting will be used in any given 
case.  In other words, a court may employ both outcome- and 
issue-based voting, but it would have a fixed policy in place that 
dictated which method to use each time the judges encountered the 
doctrinal paradox through a majority vote.  
The first context-specific strategy that was suggested in the 
literature was the proposal for a “meta-vote” put forward by 
Kornhauser & Sager.218  Under their proposal, when a paradoxical 
voting result occurred, the judges on multi-member courts would 
take the time to “deliberate about the appropriate collegial action 
to take in the case before them . . . .”219  After doing so, the judges 
would then vote on how the judgment in the case should be 
aggregated.  In addition to holding a meta-vote, Kornhauser & 
Sager argued that the judges should then take the additional step 
of “proffer[ing] an opinion or several opinions justifying their 

216 See generally Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 579 (2005) (arguing that certain design elements in treaties such as 
dispute resolution mechanisms increase the costs of non-compliance, and thus 
states have rational reasons to not include these elements in order to make it 
easier to violate the treaties when non-compliance is in their interests). 
217 See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17 (explaining the Condorcet paradox 
and failing assumptions in ranking preferences within a group); Nash, supra note 
43. 
218 See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 30 (discussing judges’ use of 
both outcome- and issue-based voting and using the meta-vote as a method of 
tabulating and documenting these judicial decisions).   
219 Id.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
	
	


		 
 U.Pa.J.Int’lL.  !"#$

meta-vote.”220  According to Kornhauser & Sager, there are several 
advantages to this procedure.  Perhaps the most distinctive is that 
by drafting decisions justifying the meta-vote, the court could 
begin to develop jurisprudence on how votes should be aggregated 
in different circumstances.221  Additionally, this strategy would 
ensure that courts are not boxed into one judgment aggregation 
mechanism when it may not lead to the best outcome in all 
circumstances.222  Furthermore, it would allow courts to learn from 
the experiences of other judicial bodies.223   
However, this strategy also has several drawbacks in 
international settings.  First, if judges were forced to take a meta-
vote that would later be publically disclosed as part of the decision, 
they may feel even greater political pressure to not cast a vote that 
crosses the interests of the powerful states.224  Second, by 
attempting to articulate justifications for the judgment aggregation 
method used, the court might appear less principled than if it had 
a fixed aggregation rule or if it had simply made a decision behind 
the scenes.  
A second type of context-specific voting procedure has been 
proposed by Jonathan Remy Nash.225  Nash proposed a complex 
hybrid system that lays out specific criteria for when issue-based 
and outcome-based voting should be used.226  A very simplified 
take of Nash’s complex proposal is that pure issues of law would 
be decided by outcome-based voting, while pure issues of fact 
would be decided by issue-based voting.227  The purported benefit 

220 Id.  
221 See id. at 32 (observing how the meta-vote makes “possible the 
development of a systematic, reflective jurisprudence of collective judicial 
action”).   
222 See id (noting how a meta-vote might offer a procedure for choosing 
among different protocols).  
223 See, e.g., Jonathan J. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of 
the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 700 
(1999) (noting that after experimentation has occurred in different international 
courts, “one would expect that the best ideas will be adopted widely”). 
224 See Ginsburg, supra note 135 (discussing the influence that relatively 
powerful states possess in international courts). 
225 See Nash, supra note 43. 
226 See id. at 146–58.  For a simplified explanation of Nash’s proposal, see 
Meyerson, supra note 43, at 77. 
227 See Nash, supra note 43, at 158–59 (“The substantive portion of the 
proposal would employ outcome-based voting to resolve pure questions of law 
and issue-based voting to resolve other questions.”). 
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of establishing this kind of complex policy is that it does not 
require the court to revisit the question of which judgment 
aggregation method to use each time the doctrinal paradox occurs 
while still incorporating the advantages of both issue- and 
outcome-based voting.228   
Like the meta-vote, a complex context-specific voting protocol 
like the one proposed by Nash would have several negative 
consequences if an international court or tribunal employed it.  The 
first is a result of the fact that the procedures of international courts 
are still in their early stages of development,229 so policymakers 
may not have the knowledge necessary to craft a complex decision 
that would effectively minimize the potentially harmful effects of 
the doctrinal paradox.  An additional drawback is that this type of 
decision rule does not exist at all in domestic courts.230  If 
international courts were to adopt a policy that is dramatically 
different than those found in domestic institutions, it may only 
serve to increase the perception that international courts and law 
are strange and unnecessarily bureaucratic.  
5.3. Issue-Based Voting in International Adjudication 
As discussed in Section 2.4, there are a number of major 
drawbacks associated with issue-based voting as a way of 
resolving the doctrinal paradox.  Of these potential drawbacks, at 
least four are intensified in international settings.  
First, the primary argument that is leveled against issue-based 
judgment aggregation is that it adds a level of complexity by 
making judges debate and decide which issues are the critical ones 
that must be decided to resolve the case.  Because almost all cases 
involve a range of substantive issues, choosing the critical 
component issues to vote on makes deciding a case that much 

228 See infra Sections 5.3 and 5.4 (discussing the advantages and drawbacks of 
issue-based and outcome-based voting). 
229 See supra text accompanying note 127 (noting that a majority of present 
day international courts are still in the beginning of their maturation). 
230 See Nash, supra note 43, at 147 (“[E]ven if outcome-based voting is not the 
product of natural evolution, it is nonetheless unquestionably the dominant 
protocol today; again, the fact that certain exceptions persist suggests that those 
exceptions ought presumptively to be retained.”).  We cannot find any evidence of 
a court adopting a complex decision rule like the one that Nash outlines.  
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more difficult.231  Furthermore, because this method of judgment 
aggregation necessitates voting on the component issues to 
determine the outcome, judges may advocate voting on specific 
issues in order to manipulate the ultimate outcome in favor of their 
own beliefs.  Although there will always be a certain amount of 
politicking that goes on behind the scenes in any court, it may not 
be wise to intentionally introduce a procedure into international 
adjudicatory bodies that creates incentives for gamesmanship.  
Since judges serve short terms and are reappointed by their 
government, there are already incentives in place for these judges 
to act strategically.  Introducing an explicit avenue for political 
maneuvering will negatively impact the perception (and perhaps 
the reality) that international judicial bodies are acting consistently 
and fairly. 
Second, deciding what component issues that the court should 
vote on is even more difficult in the absence of clearly established 
precedent.  In domestic legal cases, there are often explicit 
doctrinal tests that have been established through prior decisions 
by the same court or higher courts.  Even when such tests do exist, 
there is still room for negotiation over what component issues the 
court should decide.  Without clear precedent, however, 
identifying and agreeing on the salient issues is even more 
difficult.  Unsurprisingly, international tribunals are likely to be 
dealing in areas of law without clearly established doctrine or tests 
for resolving legal issues.  As compared to domestic judges, 
international judges will have to debate more frequently which 
tests to create.  As a result, international adjudicatory bodies will 
find it more difficult to engage in issue-based voting than domestic 
courts.  Worse yet, the precedent and legal tests created through 
issue-based voting may not be sufficiently parsimonious because 
the tests were originally devised for strategic, and not purely legal, 
reasons.   
Third, issue-based voting consumes a greater amount of 
judicial resources than other strategies because it requires an extra 
round of bargaining to select the salient component issues, and 
then requires every judge to think through their opinion on issues 

231 See Rogers, supra note 9, at 1002 (“When voting by outcome, individual 
justices decide what issues they deem to be relevant or dispositive, but when all 
judges are to vote on the same underlying issues, who decides which issues get a 
vote?”).  
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that are not essential to the resolution of the case.232  The result is 
that it simply takes more time and resources to resolve an 
individual case with issue-based voting.  Although it is true that 
there are a number of international courts that are serially under-
utilized by the parties that establish them, it is still an inescapable 
fact that one major weakness of existing international courts and 
tribunals is that they expend too many resources to decide cases.  It 
seems particularly unwise for international courts and tribunals to 
adopt a practice that is more resource intensive if there is another 
logically justifiable strategy available.  This course of action makes 
the court vulnerable to criticism and may make member states 
disinclined to provide resources in the future.  
Finally, issue-based voting goes against standard judicial 
practice.233  Courts have always traditionally voted on the outcome 
of the case, not on component issues, and the potential of a few 
aberrant decisions should not be enough to cause courts and 
tribunals to jettison this traditional feature of adjudication.  Since 
there are not any examples of domestic legal systems utilizing 
issue-based voting234 it may be particularly unwise for 
international law to do so.  Adopting a procedure that runs counter 
to the legal norms of the member states is likely to increase the 
perception that international law is novel in undesirable ways, 
which jeopardizes the international legal project.  
5.4. Outcome-Based Voting in International Adjudication
Alas, the shortcomings of the strategies discussed above should 
not be interpreted as counseling in favor of outcome-based voting.  
As with issue-based voting, there are at least two acknowledged 
criticisms of outcome-based voting that would be especially 
nefarious in international contexts.   
The most common argument against outcome-based voting is 
that it creates logically inconsistent precedent, which is 
problematic when it comes to resolving future cases with the same 

232 See Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note 43, at 758 
(contending that “judicial economy” is a frequent criticism of issue-based voting).  
233 See Rogers, supra note 9, at 1006 (noting that the practice of outcome 
voting is “almost universal”); see also Nash, supra note 43, at 77 (explaining that 
“judges in [America] have traditionally adhered to outcome-based voting”).   
234 See supra text accompanying notes 51–56 (explaining that many domestic 
courts have chosen not to vote on every part of the case). 
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issues.235  The thrust of this concern is that when outcome-based 
voting is used to decide a case with a doctrinal paradox, it will be 
unclear to future courts how they can apply the precedent since the 
reasoning and outcome of the case will cut in different directions.  
This is of particular importance because a range of actors, from 
lower courts to bureaucrats, often must try to comply with this 
unclear precedent.236  The coherence of international law is 
especially important to the development of the international legal 
system.237  The purpose of international law is not just to create 
precedent for use in future cases, but also to flesh out the body of 
international law so that states, international actors, and 
individuals can be guided by the courts to determine what is 
required of them.  If the international law that is produced by 
courts is logically inconsistent, it will be an unhelpful guide to 
states and actors who are seeking to understand what international 
law is and what compliance looks like.  
Second, another complaint against outcome-based voting is 
that it creates less usable precedent.  This is because judges are able 
to not discuss or decide issues that were not essential to their 
reasoning on a particular issue.238  The impact is that courts pass on 
the opportunity to create law that would help make it easier to 
interpret the law and increase the ease with which it would be 
possible to predict the future actions of the judiciary.  In the 
international setting, the decision to pass on important issues may 
come at an even higher cost than for domestic courts.   
Although the ECtHR has an incredibly active docket, there are 
many international courts that have very few opportunities to 

235 See Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note 43, at 761 
(arguing that outcome voting suffers from fundamental flaws and is 
systematically incoherent).  
236 See Nash, supra note 43, at 99 (“An appellate court that resolves a 
paradoxical case using outcome-based voting fails to give clear guidance as to the 
nature of its holding.  This ‘guidance problem’ affects later courts that try to 
follow the paradoxical case as precedent, the lower court to which the appellate 
court remands the case for further proceedings, and legislative and administrative 
bodies.”).  
237  Charney, supra note 223, at 707 (1999) (arguing that an important part of a 
useful and peaceful international legal system is coherence in international law).  
238 See Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note 43, at 759 
(“[U]sable precedent is another important output of the system, and, precisely 
because outcome-voting allows judges to decline to reach certain issues presented 
in individual cases, a far greater number of plurality opinions lacking the full 
force of law will be produced.”).  
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address important international legal issues.  This is often because 
it is difficult for parties to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts, and 
not because there are no disputes occurring.  As a result, it may be 
a missed opportunity for courts, endowed with time and resources 
but few opportunities to employ outcome-based voting when 
doing so decreases the amount of usable precedent the court will 
create.  Although this argument might not be persuasive for 
overworked domestic courts that are under a constant docket 
crunch, there are international courts for which taking the time to 
debate and decide all of the relevant issues presented by a case and 
formally voting on each one may be worthwhile because it will 
make a valuable contribution to the evolution of international law.   
6. CONCLUSION
From limited resources to low rates of compliance, 
international courts and tribunals face a staggering array of 
problems, and those who believe in the value of using law to 
resolve transnational disputes have been fighting tirelessly to find 
solutions.  It has not been our intention to heap another problem 
onto the pile.  Instead, it has been our hope that by discussing the 
relevance of judgment aggregation theory and the doctrinal 
paradox to international law, we have illustrated the inherent 
problem of viewing international courts as singular, rational agents 
while also shedding light on one source of indeterminacy in 
transnational adjudication that has received little attention.  As 
international law becomes more complex and transnational 
adjudication more common, the fractured decisions that lead to the 
occurrence of the doctrinal paradox will become all the more 
common.  As a result, it is our hope to launch a discussion of how 
international courts should aggregate their judgments to ensure 
both fairness to litigants and the orderly development of 
international law.  Hopefully, anyone who believes in logically 
sound and procedurally fair adjudication—regardless of the 
setting—will see the value of this conversation.  
  
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APPENDIX: VOTING PROCEDURES OF PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
 
Court 
(Year Created) 
Published 
Decisions? 
Provide 
Reasons? Publish Reasons? 
Published 
Dissent? Majority Voting? 
International 
Court of 
Justice—ICJ  
(1946) 
Yes (Article 58) 
The decision “shall 
be read in open 
court, due notice 
having been given 
to the agents.” 
Yes 
(Article 56)  
“The judgment 
shall state the 
reasons on 
which it’s 
based.”   
Yes 
(Article 58)   
 
Yes 
(Article 57) 
“[A]ny judge shall 
be entitled to 
deliver a separate 
opinion.” 
Yes 
(Article 55) 
“All questions shall 
be decided by a 
majority of the judges 
present.” 
European Court 
of Justice—ECJ 
(1952) 
Yes 
(Article 37)  
“Judgments shall be 
signed by the 
President and the 
Registrar. They shall 
be read in open 
court.” 
Yes  
(Article 36)  
“Judgments shall 
state the reasons 
on which they 
are based.” 
Yes  
(Article 37)  
 
Unclear 
There is no explicit 
ban in the statute, 
but there has never 
been a dissenting 
opinion.   
Unclear 
There is no mention 
of voting.  
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Court 
(Year Created) 
Published 
Decisions? 
Provide 
Reasons? Publish Reasons? 
Published 
Dissent? Majority Voting? 
European Court 
of Human 
Rights—ECtHR 
(1959) 
Yes 
(Rule 78)  
“[F]inal judgments 
of the Court shall be 
published . . . .” 
Yes  
(Rule 74) 
The judgment 
will contain 
“reasons in point 
of law.” 
Yes 
(Rule 74) 
Yes  
(Rule 74) 
“Any judge . . . 
shall be entitled to . 
. . a separate 
opinion, concurring 
with or dissenting 
from that 
judgment, or a bare 
statement of 
dissent.” 
Yes 
(Rule 88) 
“Reasoned decisions 
and advisory 
opinions shall be 
given a majority vote 
by the Grand 
Chamber.” 
Inter-American 
Court of Human 
Rights—IACtHR 
(1979)  
Yes 
(Article 32) 
“The Court shall 
make public . . . its 
judgments, orders, 
opinions, and other 
decisions . . . .” 
Yes 
(Article 65)  
A judgment 
must contain 
“legal 
arguments” in 
addition to the 
ruling on the 
case. 
Yes 
(Article 32, 65) 
Yes 
(Article 32) 
“The Court shall 
make public . . . 
separate opinions, 
dissenting or 
concurring . . . .” 
Yes  
(Article 16)  
“The decisions of the 
Court shall be 
adopted by a majority 
of the Judges present 
at the time of voting.” 
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Court 
(Year Created) 
Published 
Decisions? 
Provide 
Reasons? Publish Reasons? 
Published 
Dissent? Majority Voting? 
Andean 
Tribunal of 
Justice—ATJ 
(Court of Justice 
of the Andean 
Community—
TJAC) (1984)  
Unclear 
 
Yes 
(Article 76-82) 
Yes 
(Article 76-82) 
No 
(Article 76-82) 
There is no 
mention of a right 
to dissent or issue a 
separate opinion. 
Yes  
(Article 23) 
Magistrates selected 
to write a judgment 
based on the majority 
opinion. 
Court of Justice 
of the European 
Free Trade 
Association 
States—EFTA 
Court (1992) 
Yes 
(Article 61, 65) 
 
Yes  
(Article 23)  
“Every Judge 
taking part in the 
deliberations 
shall state his 
opinion and the 
reasons for it.” 
Yes 
(Article 60) 
 
No 
(Article 23) 
Yes 
(Article 23) 
“The conclusions 
reached by the 
majority of the Judges 
after final discussion 
shall determine the 
decision of the 
Court.” 
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Court 
(Year Created) 
Published 
Decisions? 
Provide 
Reasons? Publish Reasons? 
Published 
Dissent? Majority Voting? 
Economic Court 
of the  
Commonwealth 
of  
Independent 
States—ECCIS 
(1993) 
Yes 
“The chamber can 
decide to make 
public only the 
Resolution of the 
decision yet it has to 
provide parties with 
the complete 
decision within 30 
days from the 
moment of the 
public delivery of 
the resolution.” 
Unclear No  
“The chamber can 
decide to make 
public only the 
Resolution of the 
decision yet it has to 
provide parties with 
the complete 
decision within 30 
days from the 
moment of the 
public delivery of 
the resolution.” 
No 
Dissenting 
Opinion, not 
published  
“Dissenting judges 
can provide the 
Head of the 
chamber with their 
opinion in 
writing.” 
 Unclear 
International 
Criminal 
Tribunal for the 
Former 
Yugoslavia—
ICTY (1993)  
Yes  
(Rule 98 ter) 
“The judgement 
shall be pronounced 
in public . . . .” 
  
Yes 
(Rule 98 ter) 
 
Yes 
(Rule 98 ter) 
Yes 
(Rule 98 ter) 
“[S]eparate or 
dissenting opinions 
may be appended.” 
 
Yes 
(Rule 98 ter)   
“The judgement shall 
be rendered by a 
majority of the 
judges.” 
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Court 
(Year Created) 
Published 
Decisions? 
Provide 
Reasons? Publish Reasons? 
Published 
Dissent? Majority Voting? 
Central 
American Court 
of Justice— 
CACJ (1994)  
Yes  
(Article 45) 
“The statements 
which they shall 
formulate to that 
effect shall be 
written down with a 
clear reference to the 
respective record, in 
a special book called 
Book of Votes.” 
Yes 
 (Article 45) 
Yes 
 (Article 45)  
“It is the right of the 
judges to have the 
reasons of their 
motions and votes 
included in the 
record.”  
No  
(Article 45) 
“The judges shall 
not formulate any 
protest against the 
decisions of the 
court, or against 
the opinions of 
their colleagues.” 
Yes  
(Article 40) 
Court of the 
Justice of the 
Common 
Market for 
Eastern and 
Southern 
Africa—
COMESA CJ 
(1994) 
Yes  
(Article 31) 
The decision shall be 
“deliver[ed] in 
public session . . . .” 
Yes  
(Article 31)  
Yes 
 (Article 31) 
No  
(Article 31) 
“The Court shall 
deliver one 
judgment only in 
respect of every 
reference to it . . .” 
Yes 
(Article 31) 
“The judgment of the 
Court reached in 
private by majority 
verdict.”  
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Court 
(Year Created) 
Published 
Decisions? 
Provide 
Reasons? Publish Reasons? 
Published 
Dissent? Majority Voting? 
Inter-national 
Criminal 
Tribunal for 
Rwanda—ICTR 
(1994) 
Yes 
 (Article 22) 
The judgement 
“shall be delivered 
by the Trail 
Chamber in public.” 
Yes 
(Article 22) 
Yes 
(Article 22) 
Yes  
(Article 22) 
“[S]eparate or 
dissenting opinions 
may be appended.” 
Yes 
(Article 22) 
“The judgement shall 
be rendered by a 
majority of the judges 
... “  
Appellate Body 
of the World 
Trade Organ-
ization—WTO 
Appellate Body 
(1994) 
Yes 
  
Unclear Unclear Yes 
(Article 3.2) 
Yes  
(Article 3.2) 
“The Appellate Body 
and its divisions shall 
make every effort to 
take their decisions by 
consensus.  Where, 
nevertheless, a 
decision cannot be 
arrived at by 
consensus, the matter 
at issue shall be 
decided by a majority 
vote.”  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
Court 
(Year Created) 
Published 
Decisions? 
Provide 
Reasons? Publish Reasons? 
Published 
Dissent? Majority Voting? 
Inter-national 
Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea—
ITLOS (1996)  
Yes  
(Article 125)  
 
Yes  
(Article 125) 
Yes 
(Article 125) 
Yes  
(Article 125)  
Yes 
(Article 125) 
 
Caribbean Court 
of Justice—CCJ 
(2001) 
Yes  
(Rule 29) 
Yes 
 (Rule 3) 
Yes 
(Rule 29) 
 
No  
(Rule 3) 
“No other opinion 
or judgment shall 
be given or 
delivered.” 
Yes  
(Rule 3) 
“The conclusions 
reached by the 
majority of the Judges 
after final deliberation 
shall be the decision 
or advisory opinion of 
the Court...” 
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Court 
(Year Created) 
Published 
Decisions? 
Provide 
Reasons? Publish Reasons? 
Published 
Dissent? Majority Voting? 
Court of Justice 
of the East 
African Comm-
unity—EACJ 
(2001)  
Yes  
(Rule 71) 
Unclear 
(Rule 68) 
No 
(Rule 68) 
“The Court may, in 
any particular case, 
direct that only the 
decision of the 
Court and not the 
reasons for it shall 
be delivered in 
Court.” 
Yes  
(Rule 68) 
Yes 
(Rule 68) 
Economic 
Comm-unity of 
West African 
States Comm-
unity Court of 
Justice—
ECOWAS (2001) 
Yes  
(Article 61) 
Yes 
(Article 23) 
Yes 
(Article 60) 
No  
(Article 23) 
Yes 
(Article 23) 
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Court 
(Year Created) 
Published 
Decisions? 
Provide 
Reasons? Publish Reasons? 
Published 
Dissent? Majority Voting? 
Inter-national 
Criminal 
Court—ICC 
(2002) 
Yes 
(Article 74, 50) 
 
Yes 
(Article 74) 
Yes 
(Article 74) 
Yes 
(Article 74) 
“The Trial 
Chamber shall 
issue one decision. 
When there is no 
unanimity, the 
Trial Chamber’s 
decision shall 
contain the views 
of the majority and 
the minority.” 
Yes 
(Article 7)  
“The judges shall 
attempt to achieve 
unanimity in their 
decisions, failing 
which decisions hall 
be taken by a majority 
of the judges.” 
African Court on 
Human and 
Peoples’ 
Rights—
ACtHPR (2004) 
Yes  
(Article 43)  
Yes  
(Article 43) 
Yes 
(Article 43) 
“All judgments 
shall state the 
reasons on which 
they are based.” 
Yes  
(Article 44) 
“If the judgement 
does not represent 
in whole or in part 
the unanimous 
opinion of the 
Judges, any Judge 
shall be entitled to 
deliver a separate 
or dissenting 
opinion.” 
Yes  
(Article 42) 
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Court 
(Year Created) 
Published 
Decisions? 
Provide 
Reasons? Publish Reasons? 
Published 
Dissent? Majority Voting? 
Southern 
African 
Development 
Community 
Tribunal—
SADC Tribunal 
(2005) 
Yes 
(Article 24) 
“Decisions of the 
Tribunal shall be in 
writing and 
delivered in open 
court . . . .” 
Yes  
(Rule 21) 
“Every Member 
taking part in the 
deliberations 
shall give his or 
her opinion in 
writing and the 
reasons for it.”  
Yes 
(Article 24) 
“Decisions . . . shall 
state the reasons on 
which they are 
based.”  
No 
(Rule 21) 
“The conclusions 
reached by the 
majority of the 
Members of the 
Tribunal after the 
final deliberations 
shall be the 
decisions of the 
Tribunal.”  
Yes 
(Article 24) 
“Decisions of the 
Tribunal shall be 
taken by a majority.” 
 
Note: This table presents the policies of permanent international courts that address how the decision 
making process will be conducted.  This information shows the diversity in the policies that international 
courts have in place.  It also demonstrates how the formal policies are often sufficiently vague, requiring 
that informal procedures be established to determine how judgments will be aggregated and presented. 
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